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SYMPOSIUM
HOW MUCH GOD IN THE SCHOOLS?*
SQUEEZING RELIGION OUT OF THE PUBLIC SQUARE-THE
SUPREME COURT, LEMON, AND THE MYTH OF THE
SECULAR SOCIETY
M.G. "Pat" Robertson'
I. INTRODUCTION
In an angry note he wrote to the Danbury Baptist Association in 1802,
Thomas Jefferson mentioned in passing that the First Amendment Establish-
ment Clause had built "a wall of separation between church and State."' In-
conceivable as it may be, the United States Supreme Court, starting in
1947,2 has built much of its present Establishment Clause jurisprudence on
this off-hand phrase uttered by a man, however distinguished, who was not
even present in the country when the Bill of Rights was drafted and ratified.
That judicial distortion of United States history by the Court has accom-
plished the amazing feat of drawing criticism from "people who disagree
about nearly everything else in the law."3
* The following three articles were written in conjunction with a symposium held
on February 23, 1995 at the Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William &
Mary, sponsored by the Student Division of the Institute of Bill of Rights Law.
*' B.A., Washington and Lee University; J.D., Yale University; M. Div., New York
Theological Seminary. Founder and Chairman, Christian Broadcasting Network. Found-
er and Chancellor, Regent University. Founder and President, American Center for Law
and Justice.
Jefferson stated:
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between man and his
God, that he owes account to none other for his faith or his worship, that the leg-
islative powers of government reach action only, and not opinions, I contemplate
with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people which declared
that their legislature should "make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof," thus building a wall of separation be-
tween church and State.
SAUL K. PADOVER, THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON 518-19 (1943) (quoting letter from
Thomas Jefferson to the members of the Danbury (Connecticut) Baptist Association,
Jan. 1, 1802).
2 See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (using for the first time the
"wall of separation" metaphor in an Establishment Clause case).
' Steven D. Smith, Separation and the "Secular": Reconstructing the Disestablish-
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Before joining this chorus of criticism, I must state at the outset some-
thing that may surprise (if not shock) many people. I agree that the church
and state should be separate because the separation of church and state is
good for religion, religious institutions, and the religious liberty of believers.
However, as the emphasis of the terms church and state imply, my agree-
ment depends upon a proper understanding of "separation of church and
state." I submit that properly understood, "separation of church and state"
means separation between ecclesiastical institutions and the apparatus of
government. It means that government should not set up an official sect or
denomination on which it bestows its special blessing. It means that govern-
ments should not control or intervene in the internal affairs of religious in-
stitutions. And it means churches, as is the case of the Anglican Church in
the United Kingdom, should not have official representation in government.
It should never mean, however, that religious ideals and ideas are to be ex-
cluded from the political and lawmaking processes. Nor should it mean that
government is (or should be) disabled from generally endorsing, promoting,
or encouraging religious belief and practice, from acknowledging God, or
even from giving certain forms of aid (including financial) that advance the
cause of religion. In the history of the American experiment, "separation of
church and state" has never meant that American citizens would be forced
to live by judicial fiat in a completely secular state.4
Why do I say that separating ecclesiastical and governmental institutions
is good for religion and religious belief? Simply put, government should not
be in the business of running churches or telling people when or how to
practice religion. Likewise, organized religious institutions should not be
controlling the levers of political power. History demonstrates that such in-
termingling of ecclesiastical and political power tends to corrupt the church,
often with untoward results to the faith of believers. "The worldliness and
corruption of the pre-Reformation papacy, ... the decline of the German
Hohenstaufen dynasty, the religious wars of the sixteenth century, and, more
recently, the English civil war of the seventeenth century were all problems
resulting, to some extent, from an overly close relationship between church
and state."5 Conversely, history is also replete with tragic examples of secu-
lar tyrants who were more than willing to manipulate and even plunder ec-
ment Decision, 67 TEX. L. REv. 955, 956 (1989) [hereinafter Smith, Separation and the
"Secular"]; see also id. at 956 n.1 (citing comments denigrating the Supreme Court's
present Establishment Clause jurisprudence made by Leonard Levy, who generally fa-
vors an interpretation of the Establishment Clause requiring strict separation of Church
and State, by Critical Legal Studies Scholar Mark V. Tushnet, and by former Reagan
administration Solicitor General Rex Lee).
' Professor Smith provides an extended and well-reasoned discussion and defense
of the proposition that disestablishment--"separation of church and state"-means insti-
tutional separation, not secularization. See generally id.
' Id. at 964 n.45.
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clesiastical institutions to further their selfish political ends.
Unfortunately, the past half-century has seen a determined effort to radi-
cally alter the historical understanding of separation. During the past several
decades, both the popular and the legal mind have tended to redefine "sepa-
ration of church and state" as the establishment of a completely secular state
in which religion on one hand and government and politics on the other are
to be completely (or as completely as possible) sealed off from each other.
Religion is seen as having only private value, as being good only for the
individual believer, and as conferring no public benefit. Beyond this, reli-
gion is seen as a divisive force that must be kept in its place for the peace
and good order of society.
For example, in defending a law that prohibited the use of public school
facilities after school hours by religious speakers (while opening those facil-
ities to practically any other speakers), the Attorney General of New York
stated that "[r]eligious advocacy ... serves the community only in the eyes
of its adherents and yields a benefit only to those who already believe."'6 In
a similar vein, one legal scholar has written that religion has no place in a
democratic government because it does not fit with the intellectual comer-
stone of modem democracy.7
Supreme Court justices often have joined the chorus. Professor Michael
McConnell has noted in the Religion Clauses decisions of the Warren and
Burger Courts a "tendency to press relentlessly in the direction of a more
secular society. The Court's opinions seemed to view religion as an
unreasoned, aggressive, exclusionary, and divisive force that must be con-
fined to the private sphere."8 McConnell cites several examples of language
6 Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141, 2151
(1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting oral argument transcript); see also Jay Alan
Sekulow et al., Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District: An End
to Religious Apartheid, 14 Miss. C. L. REv. 27, 28 & n.6 (1993). In Lamb's Chapel,
the Court appears, fortunately, to have rejected the Attorney General's argument. The
Court held that a local school district which had excluded a religious speaker from ac-
cess to school facilities to address a subject addressed by other speakers violated the
religious speaker's right to free speech by discriminating against the religious speaker
based on the viewpoint of the speech. Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2143. I will discuss
Lamb's Chapel further in Part III.
1 Steven G. Gey, Why is Religion Special?: Reconsidering the Accommodation of
Religion under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 75,
79 (1990). Other scholars have expressed similar sentiments. See, e.g., Kathleen M.
Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 195, 198 (1992) (calling
for "establishment of the secular public moral order"); Ruti Teitel, When Separate is
Equal: Why Organized Religious Exercises, Unlike Chess, Do Not Belong in the Public
Schools, 81 Nw. U. L. REv. 174 (1986) (arguing that allowing religious student groups
to meet at public schools on the same terms as other student groups violates the Estab-
lishment Clause).
Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV.
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from Supreme Court opinions to support his thesis. I will cite but one. In
the case of Grand Rapids District v. Ball,9 the Court struck down a law al-
lowing public school employees to provide remedial learning assistance to
parochial school children on parochial school grounds.1" Justice Brennan
explained for the Court that "teachers in such an atmosphere may well sub-
tly (or overtly) conform their instruction to the environment in which they
teach, while students will perceive the instruction provided in the context of
the dominantly religious message of the institution; thus reinforcing the in-
doctrinating effect.""
This was a remarkable assertion in light of the fact that there was no
evidence in Grand Rapids of any religious "proselytizing" (much less "in-
doctrination") by any public school teachers, who were teaching courses
such as "Math Topics," "Spanish," and "Gymnastics."' 2 The remedial
learning programs involved in Grand Rapids and its companion case,
Aguilar v. Felton, a offered no real threat to anybody's religious liberty or
threat to "establish" the Catholic Church as the official religion of Michigan
and New York. Yet, the Court's fear of the seemingly mystical power of
religion to overcome professional teachers' sense of duty and responsibility
(a power that could overcome those teachers merely by allowing the teach-
ers to set foot on parochial school premises!) led the Court to strike down
remedial learning programs that "helped thousands of impoverished parochi-
al school children to overcome educational disadvantages."4
The lack of any evidence of any real threat of religious establishment in
Grand Rapids and Aguilar highlights the message inherent in the passage
115, 120 (1992) [hereinafter McConnell, Religious Freedom]; see also Mark Fischer,
The Sacred and the Secular: An Examination of the "Wall of Separations" and Its Im-
pact on the Religious World View, 54 U. PITT. L. REv. 325, 340 (1992) ("Underlying
many of the theories used in Establishment Clause jurisprudence is an implicit disdain
for the religious world view.").
9 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
1o Id. at 388.
Id.
2 d. at 399 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 401
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 424 (1985)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (noting in a case striking down a remedial learning program
similar to that struck down in Ball that "in 19 years there has never been a single inci-
dent in which [an] ... instructor 'subtly or overtly' attempted to 'indoctrinate the stu-
dents in particular religious tenets at public expense"') (quoting Grand Rapids, 473 U.S.
at 397).
13 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
'4 Id. at 431 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also id. at 419-20 (Burger, C.J., concur-
ring) ("[Iln the face of the human cost entailed by this decision, the Court does not
even attempt to identify any threat to religious liberty ... . It borders on paranoia to
perceive the Archbishop of Canterbury or the Bishop of Rome lurking behind programs
that are ... vital to the Nation's school children.").
226 [Vol. 4:1
SQUEEZING RELIGION OUT OF THE PUBLIC SQUARE
cited from Grand Rapids. As Professor McConnell noted:
The evocative words in [the Grand Rapids] pas-
sage---"conform," "dominantly religious," "indoctrina-
tion,"-suggest that the Justices who joined the opinion be-
lieve that religious convictions are reached not through
thoughtful consideration and experience, but through confor-
mity and indoctrination. This view of religion justifies dis-
criminating against religious schools, because indoctrination
is the antithesis of democratic education. Moreover, the Jus-
tices seemed to view religion as not only unreasoned but
insidious. The "atmosphere" of a Catholic school has such
power to influence the unsuspecting mind that it may move
even public school remedial English and math specialists to
"conform"-though their only contact with the school is to
walk down its halls. 5
One observer has given the name "religious cleansing" to the tendency
to discount and privatize religious belief.6
Just as ethnic cleansing attempts to rid certain ethnic groups
and their influence from public life, so religious cleansing
attempts to do the same with religious groups, their beliefs,
and their values. How? Not by physical extermination-at
least not in the United States-but by political and legal con-
tainment. If as Christians all of our views on contemporary
major issues are seen as religious; if "religious" views are to
be kept in church buildings or behind the front door of our
homes lest we violate certain contemporary notions of the
separation of church and state; and if taking positions on the
critical ideas-such as liberty, life, and family-that shape
culture is somehow deemed "improper" for a religious per-
son, then what are we left with? No voice in the marketplace
of ideas. Sure, we can sit around in our homes and churches
and discuss political, moral, and social issues. Yes, we can
vote our conscience. But if we move beyond these borders
and step into city hall or the courts or the public schools or
federal offices or virtually any other public arena, then we
become trespassers-violators who need to be pushed back
McConnell, Religious Freedom, supra note 8, at 122.
16 KEITH A. FOURNIER, A HOUSE UNITED? EVANGELICALS AND CATHOLICS TO-
GETHER-A WINNING ALLIANCE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 152 (1994).
1995] 227
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
to the private sphere where our ideas cannot impact, or even
threaten to impact, anyone but ourselves. 7
Present Supreme Court First Amendment jurisprudence is embodied for
the most part in the tripartite test established in Lemon v. Kurtzman.8 Un-
der that test, a government policy touching on religion will pass constitu-
tional muster if it has a secular legislative purpose, has a principal or prima-
ry effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and does not foster ex-
cessive entanglement between government and religion. 9
I say that Lemon embodies present Supreme Court Establishment Clause
jurisprudence "for the most part" because Lemon has come under a great
deal of criticism by both Court members and scholars. Scholars have la-
mented the doctrinal confusion the Court has engendered in applying Lem-
on.2" Justice Scalia has called present Supreme Court Establishment Clause
jurisprudence "embarrassing";21 Chief Justice Rehnquist has criticized the
test for not being accurately grounded in history.22 In its most recent Estab-
lishment Clause case, four of the Court's present members called for aban-
doning the Lemon test.23 The Court itself has ignored Lemon in recent cas-
es, 24 and in other cases relegated the test's three prongs to the status of
"helpful signposts."25
Despite this criticism, Lemon survives. In Lee v. Weisman,26 the Court
specifically refused to reconsider Lemon.27 The Court in fact applied the
Lemon test ,in its recent decision in Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Un-
17 Id.
403 U.S. 602 (1971).
'9 Id. at 612-13.
20 See, e.g., Jesse H. Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Recon-
ciling the Conflict, 41 U. PITT. L. REV. 673, 680-86 (1980); Keith A. Fournier, In the
Wake of Weisman: The Lemon Test is Still a Lemon, But the Psycho-Coercion Test is
More Bitter Still, 2 REGENT U. L. REv. 1 (1992); Douglas Laycock, Equal Access and
Moments of Silence: The Equal Status of Religious Speech by Private Speakers, 81 Nw.
U. L. REV. 1, 20-28 (1986) [hereinafter Laycock, Equal Access]; Smith, Separation and
the "Secular," supra note 3, at 956-57 & n. 1; John T. Valauri, The Concept of Neutral-
ity in Establishment Clause Doctrine, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 83, 129-44 (1986).
21 Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 639 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
22 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 110 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
23 See Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481, 2498-99 (1994) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring); id. at 2515 (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Thomas,
J.).
24 See id. at 2515 (mentioning Lemon in passing in two citations); Zobrest v.
Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783
(1983).
25 See Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973).
26 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
27 Id. at 2650, 2655.
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ion Free School District.28 The Supreme Court has not overruled Lemon,
and lower courts are bound to-and do-apply it. Thus, for better or worse,
when considering the state of Establishment Clause jurisprudence in this
country, one must consider Lemon.
Considering Lemon is what this Article generally proposes to do. How-
ever, I do not intend to attempt to reconcile the various Supreme Court cas-
es applying (and ignoring) Lemon to propose any grand doctrinal synthesis
or discover the underlying principle (if any) tying the cases together.29
Rather, my goals are more modest. First, I will explain briefly how the
religious world view is beneficial-indeed crucial-to representative govern-
ment and human liberty, and why that world view should be included in the
political process and public debate. Next, I will examine several cases to
show how Lemon and certain "twists" on the reasoning underlying Lemon
could, if rigorously applied, lead to the removal of the religious world view
from the political process,, in effect disenfranchising religious believers.
Although a series of recent Supreme Court and lower federal court cases
have at least recognized that the Establishment Clause provides no excuse
for censoring religious speech in public fora, I will explain that even in
those cases the Court has reserved the means to keep religion in check.
Finally, I will discuss how the Establishment Clause does not compel the
notion that religion and politics are to be kept separate, or that government
may provide no encouragement or aid to religion.3"
Professor Gerard V. Bradley of Notre Dame Law School has written a
passage that concisely sums up this Article's thesis. Bradley states:
Reason discloses that religion is truly a good for everyone,
and society rightly promotes it .... Religion, or the good of
28 113 S. Ct. 2141, 2148 (1993) (holding, under Lemon, that the Establishment
Clause does not justify discriminating against religious speakers based on the religious
viewpoint of their speech).
29 Such an effort to uncover the Court's underlying rationale in its Religion Clauses
jurisprudence has been offered by one scholar who concludes that since Everson, the
Court has made a conscious effort to "privatize" religion-that is to remove religion
from the public realm by reducing religion to a subjective preference rather than "a
reality ... the believer experiences as compelling. . . , as objective truth, as an unde-
niable fact." Gerard V. Bradley, Dogmatomachy--A "Privatization" Theory of the Reli-
gion Clause Cases, 30 ST. Louis U. L.J. 275, 277 (1986) [hereinafter Bradley,
Dogmatomachy]. According to Bradley, the Court has sought this privatization as a so-
lution to what the Court has perceived as the potential divisiveness of conflicts along
religious lines. Id. I will return to the "divisiveness" issue in Part III.
30 In doing so, I do not propose to state conclusively exactly what the Establishment
Clause does mean. I am content to show that if anything, the Clause does not require
the establishment of a completely secular state or the prohibition of all government en-
couragement or aid to religion.
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it for human persons, is intrinsically voluntary because it
involves adherence to certain propositions as true, as really
disclosing a transcendent reality which is a fit object of wor-
ship and prayer. Religion is, and should be acknowledged as,
a basic human good. Government ought to promote it. The
religion clauses, construed faithfully on an originalist basis,
work no barrier to that proposal. The Lemon test does. Thus,
we should get rid of the Lemon test.31
II. THE POSITIVE ROLE OF RELIGION IN THE CULTURE AND POLITICS.
To the believer, of course, religion is important-indeed, the most im-
portant element in human existence-because it provides the framework
within which man relates to God, the Supreme Being. And to the Christian,
man gains eternal life through faith in Jesus Christ.
At least one hundred million Americans claim membership in one or
more Christian denominations. American Christians not only believe that
God exists to bring eternal life, but that God has established moral laws
which form the only objective standard by which the personal or collective
actions of human beings living on earth can be judged. Today's Christians
are the spiritual heirs of the founders of America, whose profoundly reli-
gious beliefs have shaped our institutions.
The constitution of every single state in the United States contains some
reference to God. Our pledge of allegiance to the flag of the United States,
our coinage, and our patriotic songs all acknowledge a supreme being. This
fact was recognized in the well known case decided by a previous Supreme
Court, Zorach v. Clauson,32 in which Mr. Justice Douglas wrote: "[W]e are
a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being."33 This
nation's founding document, the Declaration of Independence, recognized
the reality that human rights come not from government, but from God:
"We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that
they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that
among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness.""
The concepts of "self-evident truth" and "unalienable rights" both have a
long pedigree in Christian thought. "Seventeenth century Enlightenment ra-
tionalists did not coin the term 'self-evident.' Medieval theologians used the
term centuries earlier, tracing their views of 'self-evident' to the teachings
Gerard V. Bradley, Protecting Religious Liberty: Judicial and Legislative Respon-
sibilities, 42 DEPAUL L. REv. 253, 260-61 (1992).
as 323 U.S. 306 (1952).
a3 Id. at 313.
34 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
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of St. John of Damascus."" Medieval Christian thinkers such as Thomas
Aquinas regarded "self-evident" knowledge as "first principles" naturally
implanted in men by God." Aquinas' thought was built on a biblical un-
derstanding of knowledge. John Locke, who had an undeniable influence on
the drafting of the Declaration, built upon this same biblical understanding
in formulating and setting forth his own view of self-evident truth.37
Likewise, the concept of "unalienable rights"-including rights to life,
property, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness-is traceable back to medi-
eval Christian theological and legal thought, and ultimately to Scripture.38
As one commentator has noted:
The doctrine of individual rights was not a late medieval ab-
erration from an earlier tradition of objective right or of nat-
ural moral law. Still less was it a seventeenth-century inven-
tion of Suarez or Hobbes or Locke. Rather, it was a charac-
teristic product of the great age of creative jurisprudence
that, in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, established the
foundations of the Western legal tradition.39
Some would argue that even though human rights might have had reli-
gious roots, those rights are now secured by their inclusion in the Bill of
Rights and can continue to be secured by a consensus of the American peo-
ple.4" But consensus, absent any objective basis of morality, provides no
35 GARY T. AMOS, DEFENDING THE DECLARATION 77 (1989).
36 THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA Pts. I-II, Q. 100, Art. 3 (Dominican
trans., Christian Classics 1981); see AMOS, supra note 35, at 76, 78.
31 See generally AMoS, supra note 35, at 75-101. Amos concludes that Locke's
views were not of the Enlightenment. Rather, his use of the term "self-evident" was re-
ligious. Thus, the founders used a Christian idea when they used the term "self-evident"
in the Declaration of Independence. Id.
3 See id. at 103-11, 115-21.
3 Brian Tierney, Villey, Ockham and the Origin of Individual Rights, in THE
WEIGHTIER MATTERS OF THE LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND RELIGION (John Witte, Jr. &
Frank S. Alexander eds., 1988), quoted in AMos, supra note 35, at 124.
o For example, at a panel discussion held on September 30, 1994, in conjunction
with the dedication of Robertson Hall (Regent University's Law and Government Build-
ing), Barry Lynn stated:
I get my rights from the Bill of Rights and from our Constitution, but I exercise
my responsibilities because I am a Christian. And I think we can revere, respect,
and celebrate the protections of our Bill of Rights and still not only exercise re-
sponsibilities ourselves, but indeed urge other people to do the same.
Defining American Culture: A Panel Discussion, 2 LIBERTY, LIFE, AND FAMILY 93
(forthcoming 1995) (remarks of Barry Lynn, Executive Director of Americans United
for Separation of Church and State). In his summary remarks at the discussion, Robert
Peck of the ACLU stated that there tended to be much agreement among the panel
1995]
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secure basis for human rights. As noted by one commentator, principles
such as liberty "are like cut flowers: they come from certain roots, and those
roots are religious roots. When the cut flowers are severed from their roots
they maintain their beauty for a while .... But in time, without the nour-
ishment of the soil, those values will wither and die .. .
How can "consensus" secure rights? For instance, suppose our society
forms a consensus that this country is overpopulated and that a good solu-
tion to that problem would be to force pregnant women to abort if they al-
ready have two children? What would prevent us from enacting such a law?
Some might answer: "the Due Process Clause." But the Constitution itself is
a legal document, subject to amendment.42 Although amending the Consti-
tution is a more cumbersome process than enacting statutes, if sufficient
"consensus" exists, nothing in the positive legal order prevents the people
from amending the Constitution, for better or worse.
Moral relativism, which denies both transcendent truth and objective
morality, can lead in the legal order to a crude legal positivism in which law
is essentially just an assertion of the lawmaker's will. According to Hans
Kelsen, the twentieth century's foremost positivist jurist, "legal norms ...
are not valid by virtue of their content. Any content whatsoever can be legal;
there is no human behavior which could not function as the content of a
legal norm. ' 43 As two commentators have noted:
When Kelsen wrote that "[a]ny content whatsoever can
be legal," he meant it. Witness Kelsen's response to Nazi
law that authorized concentration camps, forced labor, and
murder: "Such measures may morally be violently con-
demned; but they cannot be considered as taking place out-
side the legal order . . . ." Thus, to the positivist, "the
law... under the Nazi-government was law .... 44
members regarding rights "[n]ot because of any religious-based agreement, but because
we all believe in those principles of liberty and justice for all." Id. (remarks of Robert
Peck, Legislative Counsel for the ACLU).
41 Id. at 114 (remarks of Mona Charen, syndicated columnist).
42 See U.S. CONST. art. V.
4' Hans Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law, 51 LAW Q. REV. 517, 517-18 (1934) (em-
phasis added).
" Charles E. Rice & John P. Tuskey, The Legality and Morality of Using Deadly
Force to Protect Unborn Children from Abortionists, 5 REGENT U. L. REV. (forthcom-
ing 1995) (citing HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 40 (Mat Knight trans., 1967);
HANS KELSEN, DAS NATURRECHT IN DER POLITISCHEN THEORIE 148 (F.M. Schmoetz
ed., 1963), quoted in F.A. HAYEK, 2 LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY (THE MIRAGE
OF SOCIAL JUSTICE) 56 (1976)). Regarding deadly force against abortionists, Rice and
Tuskey conclude that intentionally killing or injuring abortionists is neither legally nor
morally justifiable, id., a conclusion with which I fully agree.
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This is not to say that America is sliding into Nazism. But it is to say
that outside of a framework of a transcendent, objective morality (that is, a
religious framework), the human being can have no intrinsic value. This is
true of law as it is of philosophy. As Oliver Wendell Holmes noted, for the
lawmaker who does not anchor his will to an objective moral order, there is
"no reason for attributing to man a significance different in kind from that
which belongs to a baboon or grain of sand."45 Without a transcendent
truth, human worth becomes a question of utility or aesthetics. Without an
objective standard of right and wrong we cannot protect human
rights-indeed human life itself-because it is ,"right" to do so. We can only
protect human rights because doing so serves the "utility" decreed by the
majority consensus of the moment. We thus act at our own peril when we
exclude the religious voice from the political and legal process because the
exclusion of that voice removes from the political arena the only world view
on which human rights and dignity find any secure footing.
This country's Founders understood well the connection between a tran-
scendent moral order and human rights. This understanding was reflected in
the Declaration of Independence, which spoke of a "Creator" who endowed
his creatures with "unalienable rights," thereby using terms with a long reli-
gious pedigree.46
The generation that founded this country also understood that religion
was essential to the experiment in liberty and self-government this nation
represented. For those Founders, "liberty depended on faith. '47 This is
clearly stated in one of the core founding documents of the nation, the
Northwest Ordinance. Originally passed in 1787, this act expressly stated
that "[r]eligion, morality and knowledge, being necessary to good govern-
ment and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education
shall forever be encouraged."48 This understanding was also reflected in the
statements of individual Founders. Perhaps the most striking example is
George Washington's farewell address in 1796:
Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political
4 Oliver W. Holmes, Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. REv. 40, 43-44 (1918).
46 See supra text accompanying notes 33-41.
4' Gerard V. Bradley, Imagining the Past and Remembering the Future: The Su-
preme Court's History of the Establishment Clause, 18 CONN. L. REv. 827, 835 (1986)
[hereinafter Bradley, Imagining the Past]; see also HAROLD J. BERMAN, FAITH AND
ORDER: THE RECONCILIATION OF LAW AND RELIGION 210 (1993) (stating that it "was
undoubtedly the view of the men who framed the Constitution" that "the very existence
of constitutional law in the United States, and therefore of freedom of belief or disbe-
lief, rests ultimately on the religious faith of the American people"); GERARD V.
BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA 123-24 (1987) [hereinafter
BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS].
4 NORTHWEST ORDINANCE ch. 8, 1 stat. 52 (1789).
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prosperity, Religion and morality are indispensable sup-
ports .... And let us with caution indulge the supposition,
that morality can be maintained without religion. Whatever
may be conceded to the influence of refined education on
minds of peculiar structure, reason and experience both for-
bid us to expect that National morality can prevail in exclu-
sion of religious principle.49
John Adams, a key draftsman of the United States Constitution and our
second President, believed that "religion and virtue are the only foundations,
not only of republicanism ... but of social felicity under all governments
and in all combinations of human society."5 In Adams' view, "our
[C]onstitution was made only for a moral and religious people [and was]
wholly inadequate for the government of any other."'" Even Jefferson, who
has been erroneously viewed as the patron saint of the modem secular state,
stated in his first message as President that "the liberties of a nation [can-
not] be thought secure when we have removed their only firm basis, a con-
viction in the minds of the people that these liberties are of the gift of
God."52
What was true in the eighteenth century remains true today: Religion is
indispensable to liberty and self-government. As the founding generation
realized, it is incongruent to believe that a people can govern themselves as
a nation if they cannot govern themselves as individuals. Religion provides
a transcendent, objective moral standard by which people may govern their
conduct, a standard "that determines how people treat other individuals and
how they define their social duties."53 It is only possible to determine
"right" or "virtuous" behavior if one knows what is "right" or "virtuous."
Moreover, there can be no freedom among a self-governing people unless
they are controlled by individual virtue and self restraint enforced by a be-
lief in eternal rewards and eternal punishment.
The transcendent moral standard provided by religion also allows the
governed to-judge the actions of their governors against something other
49 35 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON FROM THE ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPT
SOURCES 1745-1799, at 229 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1940).
0 Letter from John Adams to Benjamin Rush (Aug. 28, 1811), in 9 THE WORKS OF
JOHN ADAMS 635, 636 (C. Adams ed., 1854).
51 RICHARD J. NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY
IN AMERICA 95 (2d ed. 1988).
52 PADOVER, supra note 1, at 677; see also Bradley, Imagining the Past, supra note
47, at 835 n.43 ("Jefferson feared a future American shorn of Christian morality.");
Fischer, supra note 8, at 327 ("Even Thomas Jefferson, not known as one with ortho-
dox religious beliefs, questioned whether America's liberties could remain secure if
their only firm basis-a belief that they are a gift from God-is removed.").
" Bradley, Imagining the Past, supra note 47, at 826.
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than their own often transitory (and sometimes harmful) self-interest. "[T]he
only sure guide to enacting 'just' laws is a jurisprudence that recognizes that
there is such a thing as 'justice."'54 It is only against a philosophical back-
drop that recognizes "right" from "wrong" that a citizen can have standing
to tell a government that what it is doing is "wrong." Throughout our histo-
ry, religiously motivated people have stood up to tell their government that
what it was doing was "wrong." During the civil rights movement, for ex-
ample, a Protestant minister, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., challenged the
"consensus" that tolerated government sponsored discrimination by asserting
a religious belief in the inherent dignity of every human being as a child of
God." Dr. King's work, therefore, was explicitly and self-consciously reli-
gious.56
Those who argue that religion, morality, and law do not mix should bear
in mind Dr. King's legacy-a legacy consistent with the American political
tradition. "[A]n interpretation of the establishment clause that sees in the
disestablishment decision a public commitment to the exclusion of religious
influence and rhetoric from politics and government puts the decision at
odds with much of the American political tradition.""
III. LEMON-SQUEEZING RELIGION FROM THE PUBLIC SQUARE
The religious world view should, indeed must, have a place in our cul-
4 Charles E. Rice, Natural Law, the Constitution, and the Family, 1 LIBERTY, LIFE
& FAM. 77, 78 (1994).
" This belief is reflected in a speech Dr. King made on August 28, 1963, before
over 200,000 people in Washington, D.C., in which he stated:
When we let freedom ring, when we let it ring from every village and every ham-
let, from every state and every city, we will be able to speed up that day when all
God's children-black men and white men, Jews and Gentiles, Protestants and
Catholics-will be able to join hands and sing in the words of the old Negro spir-
itual, "Free at last! Free at last! Thank God almighty, we are free at last."
Martin Luther King, Speech of Aug. 28, 1963, quoted in WILLIAM J. BENNETT, THE
BOOK OF VIRTUES 576 (1993).
56 Dr. King was also "frustrated by a media establishment which ignored the reli-
gious and philosophic basis of his life's work." Fischer, supra note 8, at 325. Reflecting
on the media, Dr. King noted that "[t]hey aren't interested in the why of what we're do-
ing, only in the what of what we're doing, and because they don't understand the why
they cannot really understand the what." NEUHAUS, supra note 51, at 98. "To Dr. King,
the why not only counted, it was the core of his ideas. Take out the why, and the what
lacked coherency." Fischer, supra note 8, at 325.
" Smith, Separation and the "Secular," supra note 3, at 989; see also McConnell,
Religious Freedom, supra note 8, at 144 ("From the War for Independence to the aboli-
tion movement, women's suffrage, labor reform, civil rights, nuclear disarmament, and
opposition to pornography, a major source of support for political change has come
from explicitly religious voices.").
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ture and politics. Moreover, the law cannot be divorced from morality. Rig-
orous application of the three-prong Lemon test, which governs most Estab-
lishment Clause analysis, however, could lead to the removal of the reli-
gious world view from the political process. In this section, I will examine
that proposition by examining several issues that may arise under Lemon.
For a law touching upon religion to meet constitutional muster, Lemon
requires that: "[f]irst, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose;
second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor
inhibits religion; [third,] the statute must not foster an excessive government
entanglement with religion."5 Lemon did not actually create a new test;
rather, it is a synthesis of tests derived from previous precedent.59 To un-
derstand the problems inherent in Lemon, one must understand from whence
it came.
Lemon's "purpose" and "effects" prongs are taken from Abington School
District v. Schempp.6  The "entanglement" prong is taken from Walz v. Tax
Commission,6 which in turn relied on Board of Education v. Allen.62 The
granddaddy of all these cases is Everson v. Board of Education,63 in which
the Court first used the "wall of separation"' metaphor in Establishment
Clause jurisprudence, holding that the Establishment Clause forbade, among
other things, "aid [to] one religion, aid [to] all religions, or [government
preference for] one religion over another."65 To Justice Rutledge and three
other Justices, the "wall of separation" meant "a complete and permanent
separation of the spheres of religious activity and civil authority by compre-
58 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (citations omitted).
59 See FOURNIER, supra note 16, at 4-5; Valauri, supra note 20, at 129-30.
- 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963) ("[T]o withstand the strictures of the Establishment
Clause there must be secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither ad-
vances nor inhibits religion."); see FOURNIER, supra note 16, at 5; Valauri, supra note
20, at 129-30.
61 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970) ("We must also be sure that the end result-the ef-
fect-is not an excessive entanglement with religion."); see FOURNIER, supra note 16, at
5; Valauri, supra note 20, at 130.
62 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (supplying texts to private school is not establishment of
religion); see Valauri, supra note 20, at 130.
63 330 U.S. 1 (1946).
64 Id. at 16.
65 Id. at 15; see Gerard V. Bradley, The No Religious Test Clause and the Constitu-
tion of Religious Liberty: A Machine that Has Gone of Itself, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REv.
674, 675 (1987) [hereinafter Bradley, No Religious Test] ("Arguably, the entire
nonestablishment opus is little more than an excruciatingly belabored footnote to this
part of Everson."); FOURNIER, supra note 16, at 5 (stating that post-Everson Establish-
ment Clause cases "proceeded to develop a test to protect" the wall of separation estab-
lished in Everson); Valauri, supra note 20, at 129-30 ("[T]he seed of Lemon did not fall
far from the tree of Everson.").
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hensively forbidding every form of public aid or support for religion. "66
This is the genesis of the extreme position contending that the religious
must be kept strictly separate from the secular, including the political pro-
cess.
Lemon's second prong-the "effects" prong-purports to ban laws that
either advance or inhibit religion.67 One might suppose from this statement
that Lemon would protect the rights of religious believers to participate fully
and freely in the political process and the marketplace of ideas. After all, to
do otherwise would surely "inhibit" religion by in effect punishing believers
for their beliefs and not allowing them the same opportunity afforded to the
nonreligious to advance their beliefs.
Despite this veneer of neutrality, the Lemon test in reality has "an inher-
ent tendency to devalue religious exercise."68 One reason for this is that the
"neutrality" the effects prong purports to advance can itself mask hostility to
religion. This is in large part because what is "neutral" is an "inherently in-
determinate" question,69 the answer to which depends in great measure on
a person's perception. Neutrality assumes a baseline. A decision can be
neutral only with relation to a given baseline against which to measure the
decision.70 Thus, when people speak about "neutrality" in the law, they
typically mean evenhanded application of a rule of law.71 For instance,
when we ask a judge to be "neutral" between a poor plaintiff and a wealthy
defendant, we do not ask the judge to give special breaks to the poor plain-
tiff to balance the advantages the defendant might have because of his
wealth. Instead, we ask the judge to "act only upon the basis of proper rules
or criteria,"72 as those criteria are determined by the law, "rather than upon
other factors the law regards as extraneous or improper .... So long as the
judge bases her decisions upon proper considerations, she can be said to be
acting neutrally."73
What is legally "neutral," then, turns out to be "parasitic"; it does not
66 Everson, 330 U.S. at 31-32 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
67 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
68 McConnell, supra note 8, at 128.
69 Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment
Neutrality and the "No Endorsement" Test, 86 MICH. L. REv. 266, 315 (1987) [herein-
after Smith, "No Endorsement" Test].
70 See id. at 314 (arguing that because "neutrality is a 'coat of many colors,' . . .
virtually anyone can find a nostrum to his liking in the cabinet of neutrality") (citations
omitted). See generally Valauri, supra note 20, at 98-144 (providing an in-depth discus-
sion of the problems inherent in defining what is neutral in the context of Establishment
Clause jurisprudence).
" See Smith, "No Endorsement" Test, supra note 69, at 327.
72 Id.
73 Id.
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generate, but instead, depends on substantive rules.74 If it turns out that
some rules would favor the poor plaintiff (for instance, a rule that allows the
judge to appoint and direct public payment for counsel for poor litigants),
the judge would still be acting neutrally by taking the plaintiff's poverty into
account. The same is true of "neutrality" in the Establishment Clause, as
Everson itself illustrates. Despite its absolute "no aid" language, Everson
actually upheld a New Jersey scheme that authorized reimbursement of
money spent by parents for public bus transportation to schools, including
parochial schools.75 The majority upheld this scheme because it provided a
general benefit to all school children.76"Not to allow parochial school stu-
dents to take advantage of that general benefit would penalize those students
and their parents because of their religion. But the dissenters would have
none of that. To them the Establishment Clause meant "no aid" to religion,
and the reimbursement scheme violated that principle." Both sides in
Everson claimed to be acting neutrally, but they measured neutrality from
different baselines. The majority thought that because New Jersey already
transported public school students, neutrality required the state to treat paro-
chial schools similarly;78 the dissenters thought that allowing all students to
attend public school if they chose was sufficiently neutral.79
The problem of "neutrality" and the danger Lemon could pose to reli-
gious practice can be seen in the tension between Lemon's "secular pur-
pose" requirement and legislative attempts to accommodate religious prac-
tice. For instance, a ban on the sale or consumption of alcoholic beverages
would severely affect the religious practices of Jews, Catholics, Eastern
Orthodox Christians, and many Protestants, all of whom use wine in their
worship services. To alleviate this burden, the legislature could include in its
general prohibition an exemption for religious use of alcoholic beverages.
It seems clear, though, that the purpose of such an exemption is precise-
ly to accommodate believers' religious practices, which in turn can be said
to "advance" those practices. While some have argued that such exemptions
serve secular purposes, ° these arguments are not wholly convincing. Thus,
" See id. at 327-29.
71 Everson, 330 U.S. at 18.
76 Id. at 6.
7 Id. at 18 (Jackson, J., dissenting); id. at 28 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
78 Id. at 18.
71 Id. at 58-60 (Rutledge, J., dissenting); see also Smith, "No Endorsement" Test,
supra note 69, at 314-15 (suggesting that the split in Everson revolved around two dif-
ferent notions of neutrality); Valauri, supra note 20, at 94-106. Both sides in Everson
derived the "separation" and "no aid" commands from what they perceived to be the
history of the Establishment Clause. Everson, 330 U.S. at 8-14; id. at 33-44 (Rutledge,
J., dissenting); see infra part IV (discussing this history).
80 See Smith, Separation and the "Secular," supra note 3, at 991-92 (suggesting that
these attempts "seem contrived and unpersuasive").
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one could argue that the secular purpose prong should forbid legislative ac-
commodations of religion." Despite the fact that accommodation is a time-
honored way of preventing indifference or hostility toward religion in our
society," from a secularist perspective that broadly defines "aid" as any
benefit to religion, not allowing such accommodations would be considered
"neutral."83 In reality, this "neutral" application of a strict "no aid" princi-
ple masks hostility to religion. This is particularly so today, when the sheer
size of government increases the prospects for government activity that will
restrict religious practice. As one commentator has noted, "[iln a society of
expanded social services, a strict interpretation of the no aid principle rele-
gates religion to a marginal and disadvantaged position."84
The potential effect Lemon could have on religious accommodation is
only a small part of the problem with the Lemon test. If one equates legis-
lative purpose with legislators' motives, Lemon could conceivably require
striking down laws because of the religious motivation of the legislators
who passed them. Taken to its logical extreme, this would for instance make
"1 See id. at 990-93; Valauri, supra note 20, at 131-34. For much the same reason,
one could conclude that such accommodations also violate Lemon's "effects" prong. See
Smith, Separation and the "Secular," supra note 3, at 992. But see Valauri, supra note
20, at 132 ("[A]ccommodations and neutralizing aids ... arguably satisfy the effect
prong of the Lemon test because they do not advance religion, but only attempt to avoid
hindering it."). The Court fortunately rejected this argument. See Corporation of the
Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987). The argument's logic, however, re-
mains for use by a less accommodating Court.
2 In Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952), the Supreme Court upheld against an
Establishment Clause challenge a "release time" program through which students were
allowed to "leave the school buildings and school grounds and go to religious centers
for religious instruction or devotional exercises." Id. at 308. To hold otherwise, the ma-
jority reasoned, would display a hostility toward religion that would be inconsistent with
this country's religious tradition:
We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being....
When the state encourages religious instruction or cooperates with religious au-
thorities by adjusting the schedule of public events to sectarian needs, it follows
the best of our traditions. For it then respects the religious nature of our people
and accommodates the public service to their spiritual needs. To hold that it may
not would be to find in the Constitution a requirement that the government show
a callous indifference to religious groups.
Id. at 313-14.
83 See generally Valauri, supra note 20, at 118-23 (discussing neutrality in the con-
text of accommodations to religion).
" Id. at 118. Thus, in an age in which government regulation becomes more intru-
sive, accommodations to religion become more important to. prevent adverse affects on
religious practice. See McConnell, Religious Freedom, supra note 8, at 129 ("To the
extent that Lemon's purpose prong requires the government to turn a blind eye to the
impact of its actions on religion, on the implicit assumption that secular effects are all
that matter, it is a recipe for intolerance.").
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laws against murder or stealing suspect if the motivation for those laws was
the religious belief that stealing and murder are violative of the Ten Com-
mandments. "[T]he purpose prong is an invitation to mischief-a not-so-
subtle suggestion that those whose understandings of justice are derived
from religious sources are second-class citizens, forbidden to work for their
principles in the public sphere."85 Any disenfranchisement of religious be-
lievers "would be a sharp and unwarranted break from our political histo-
ry .'86
Even though the Court has not adopted so extreme a view of the secular
purpose requirement that all religiously motivated laws are suspect, the lack
of historic validity or just plain commom sense of the Lemon test continues
to force the Court into mental gymnastics that rival the contortions of
Houdini. Thus, a majority of the Court was able to conclude with no trouble
in Bowers v. Hardwick7 that "morality" provides a rational basis for pro-
scribing homosexual sodomy: "The law ... is constantly based on notions
of morality, and if all laws representing essentially moral choices are to be
invalidated under the Due Process Clause, the courts will be very busy in-
deed."88 The notion of "morality" invoked in Bowers was based on reli-
gious principles, a fact that Chief Justice Burger made explicit in his con-
curring opinion.89 A "morality" based on religious principles, however, was
the very ground used to strike many other state statutes. 90
Bowers was not an Establishment Clause decision, but its principle that
congruity with religious beliefs, mores, or dogma does not necessarily make
laws suspect has been applied in First Amendment cases. In Harris v.
McRae,9 the Court rejected an argument that the Hyde Amendment, which
restricted federal funding of abortions, violated the Establishment Clause
because it incorporated into law Catholic doctrine concerning abortion's sin-
fulness and the time at which life begins. 92 Although it is hard to imagine
'5 McConnell, Religious Freedom, supra note 8, at 144.
86 Id. See generally supra part II.
87 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
88 Id. at 196.
89 See id. at 196 (Burger, C.J., concurring) ("Decisions of individuals relating to ho-
mosexual conduct have been subject to state intervention throughout the history of
Western civilization. Condemnation of those practices is firmly rooted in Judeo-Chris-
tian moral and ethical standards."); see also id. at 211 n.6 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
("The theological nature of the origin of Anglo-American antisodomy statutes is pat-
ent.").
90 See infra notes 106-33 and accompanying text.
91 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
92 Id. at 318-20. Actually, the Hyde Amendment, which in its various incarnations
allowed funding for abortion to save the life of the mother, to prevent physical health
damage, or in cases of rape and incest, id. at 302-03, did not fully reflect Catholic
teaching on abortion. The Catholic Church teaches that direct abortion is never justified
and that civil authorities have a duty to protect the unborn by prohibiting abortion from
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that at least some of the members of Congress who voted for the Hyde
Amendment were not religiously motivated (at least in part) the Court sensi-
bly held that the Amendment was not unconstitutional simply because it
"happen[ed] to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or all reli-
gions." 93
Harris implies a distinction between legislative purpose and individual
legislators' personal motives. The Court explicitly recognized that distinction
in Westside Community Schools v. Mergens.94 In Mergens, the Court up-
held the constitutionality of the Equal Access Act.95 The Act generally pro-
hibits public secondary schools that provide opportunities for non-curricu-
lum-related student groups to meet from denying such opportunities to stu-
dent religious groups.96 The school district in Mergens argued that the Act
violated the Establishment Clause because individual legislators were moti-
vated by a desire to protect and promote religious speech and worship in
public schools.97 The Court rebuffed this argument "because what is rele-
vant is the legislative purpose of the statute, not the possibly religious mo-
tives of the legislators who enacted the law."98 The Court found that the
Act's purpose-to grant equal access in schools to both religious and secu-
lar speech-was secular; that, the Court stated, ended the matter.99
the moment of conception. See CATHECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH Nos. 227-73
(St. Paul Books & Media 1994). It is, however, accurate to say that the Hyde Amend-
ment reflects the general Christian value that the unborn child is a human life worthy of
legal protection, and it seems fair to assume that religious motivation played no small
role in its passage.
93 Harris, 448 U.S. at 319 (citing McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 422
(1961)). The Court went on to note that the Amendment reflected "traditionalist" values
towards abortion as much as it did it any particular religion's view of abortion. Id. This
does not mean that the Hyde Amendment did not reflect a religious view toward abor-
tion. After all, the traditionalist values toward abortion themselves are religiously-based.
9 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
5 Id. at 253.
96 Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-74 (1988). The Act makes it unlawful
for any public secondary school which receives Federal financial assistance and
which has a limited open forum to deny equal access or a fair opportunity to, or
discriminate against, any students who wish to conduct a meeting within that lim-
ited open forum on the basis of religious, political, philosophical, or other content
of the speech at such meetings.
Id. § 4071(a). For a detailed analysis of the Act in light of Mergens and subsequent
lower federal court cases, see Jay A. Sekulow et al., Proposed Guidelines for Student
Religious Speech and Observance in Public Schools, 46 MERCER L. REv. (forthcoming
1995). See also Laycock, Equal Access, supra note 20; infra notes 147-54, 169-72 and
accompanying text.
9' Mergens, 496 U.S. at 249.
98 Id.
9 Id. Of course, the Court's conclusion that the statute's purpose is secular is open
to the objection that a law that has the purpose of promoting religious speech does not
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Despite cases such as Bowers, Harris, and Mergens, it is still by no
means clear that a legislator need not check his religious beliefs at the capi-
tol door or keep those beliefs to himself for fear of giving the courts a rea-
son to strike down laws with which they disagree. For instance, in his dis-
sent in Mergens, Justice Stevens recognized the majority's distinction be-
tween motive and purpose and conceded that if the Act "did no more than
redress discrimination against religion," it would be constitutional."° But
Justice Stevens noted that the Act also was meant to allow religious speech
even where other partisan speech had been proscribed.0 ' In Justice
Stevens's view, if a legislator voted for the statute "on the basis of a predic-
tion that the resulting speech would be religious in character,"'0 2 the legis-
lator would have a religious purpose that would make the law suspect under
the Establishment Clause."3 This would be so even though the Act on its
face proscribed discrimination against any speech based on its religious,
political, or philosophical content, since the intent to promote religious
speech "reflects a judgment that it would be desirable for people to be reli-
gious.""'' Justice Stevens's reasoning seems to boil down to this: If a leg-
islature passes a facially neutral law because its members believe that law
will be good for religion, that law may violate the Establishment Clause
because it has a religious purpose. But realistically, a religious motive, usu-
ally based on religious belief, is the most likely reason a legislator would
vote for a law because it is good for religion. If Justice Stevens's suggestion
is followed, that view, at least in some cases, would disable legislators from
acting on their religious convictions. 5
To any thinking person, the sophistry used by Stevens to try to delineate
"purpose" from "motive" or to invalidate a state legislative act because it
might be "good for religion" borders on the bizarre. Our Constitution was
have a secular purpose. See supra notes 58-66 and accompanying text.
" Mergens, 496 U.S. at 285 n.21 (citing Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos,
483 U.S. 327, 338 (1987)).
"'1 Id. at 274.
102 Id.
103 See id.
'04 Id. at 286 n.21.
"05 To be fair, Justice Stevens did not categorically state that the Act would be un-
constitutional; he only suggested it might be, but went on to state that the Act may
comply with Lemon's purpose requirement because the Act included political and philo-
sophical speech. Id. at 271 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens also recognized that
religious motive, as opposed to purpose, would not invalidate the Act; thus, if a legisla-
tor voted for the Act because of a religious belief that free speech is good, the Act
would pass muster because his purpose (to promote free speech) as opposed to the mo-
tivation for that purpose (religious belief) is secular. See id. at 285 n.21. Justice
Stevens's distinction is not easy to grasp, however, and for practical purposes motive is
often difficult to separate from purpose. A person inclined to conflate motive and pur-
pose to invalidate a statute could find a way to do so in Justice Stevens's approach.
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framed by rational men attempting to set forth broad principles to guide the
growth of an emerging nation. With the Lemon test, the Court radically de-
parted from the Constitution and in so doing has created a hodge podge of
illogical and inconsistent standards which are bewildering to laymen and a
source of continuing embarrassment to the four-member minority led by the
Chief Justice and Associate Justice Scalia.
In fact, the fruits of the kind of reasoning Justice Stevens displayed in
his Mergens dissent can be seen in two cases in which the Court struck
down laws because of a perceived legislative purpose to advance religion. In
Wallace v. Jaffree,.'6 an opinion authored by Justice Stevens, Alabama had
enacted a statute that authorized a moment of silence in public schools at
the start of each school day for "meditation or voluntary prayer. '07 The
Court's members appear to have agreed that properly implemented moment-
of-silence laws could be constitutional." 8 But the majority struck down the
Alabama law because the justices found it had no secular purpose.'0 9 The
Court cited two reasons to justify its finding of no secular purpose. First, the
law replaced an earlier moment-of-silence law that had not mentioned
prayer; because that earlier law already protected the right to pray (without
saying so), the purpose of the later law had to be to "endorse" and "pro-
mote" prayer."0 The majority also relied on statements by the law's spon-
sor, State Senator Donald Holmes, that the law's purpose was to return
voluntary prayer to the public schools."' Holmes' statements were made
after the law was enacted, a fact the majority failed to mention."2
Similarly, in Edwards v. Aguillard,"3 the Court struck down a Louisi-
ana statute requiring "balanced treatment" of evolution and creation science
in public schools." 4 The Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and
Evolution-Science in Public School Instruction Act specifically set forth that
its purpose was to "protect academic freedom."' The Court, however,
found this purpose a "sham.""' 6 Based again in large measure on state-
ments by the Act's sponsor, State Senator Bill Keith, the Court found that
the legislature's "preeminent purpose ... was clearly to advance the reli-
'- 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
107 Id. at 40.
log See id. at 59; id. at 62 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 72-73 (O'Connor, J., con-
curring).
1' Id. at 38.
"o Id. at 59.
... Id. at 57.
12 See id. at 86 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
13 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
"4 Id. at 597.
"5 Id. at 586.
116 See id. at 587, 589.
19951 243
244 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 4:1
gious viewpoint that a supernatural being created humankind.""1 7
Neither the Alabama moment-of-silence law nor the Louisiana creation-
science law can reasonably be seen as even a step in the direction of creat-
ing a state-run church or infringing on anybody's religious liberty. Surely it
cannot be improper to ensure that students hear both sides of a controversial
scientific issue."' So long as the schools are teaching scientific data and
not religious dogma (and as Justice Scalia made abundantly clear in his
dissent, there was no evidence to support the claim that the Louisiana Act
required that schools teach religious dogma)," 9 it should not matter that
some students may conclude from that data that it is more likely than not
that an intelligent creator exists, or that some students may even have exist-
ing religious beliefs reinforced. That is simply the result of young minds
17 See id. at 591.
I Evolution can mean any number of different things, not all of them controversial.
What is controversial (both biologically and theologically) is the idea, most widely
associated with Charles Darwin, that all life evolved through an evolutionary process
from a common ancestor or ancestors. Even on the theological plane. the idea that life
evolved from a common ancestor need not necessarily be inconsistent with the idea that
a creator put that process in motion, or even that the creator guided that process. But
[t]he literature of Darwinism is full of anti-theistic conclusions, such as that the
universe was not designed and has no purpose, and that we humans are the prod-
uct of blind natural processes that care nothing about us. What is more, these
statements are not presented as personal opinions but as the logical implications
of evolutionary science.
PHILLIP E. JOHNSON, DARWIN ON TRIAL 8-9 (1991). As one eminent Darwinist has stat-
ed: "Darwin made it possible to be an intellectually fulfilled atheist." Id. at 9 (quoting
Richard Dawkins, Oxford zoologist). Where schools present this mechanistic approach
to the question of origins in teaching evolution, they are necessarily presenting a view
that is hostile to religious belief.
On a biological plane, modem evolutionary theory has been subjected to serious
criticism. It is beyond the scope of this Article to present a detailed account of this
criticism or of the controversy among biologists and other scientists over evolutionary
theory. For a good overview of these subjects, see generally WENDELL R. BIRD, THE
ORIGIN OF THE SPECIES REVISITED (1991); MICHAEL DENTON, EVOLUTION: A THEORY
IN CRISIS (1986); JOHNSON, supra. Bird is the attorney who represented the State of
Louisiana in Edwards.
"9 The only evidence in the record on this subject were affidavits from two scien-
tists, a philosopher, a theologian, and an educator supporting the assertion that creation-
science "is essentially a collection of scientific data" and that "creation science is a
strictly scientific concept that can be presented without religious reference." Edwards,
482 U.S. at 612 (Scalia, J., dissenting). As Phillip Johnson notes:
The trial court held the Louisiana statute unconstitutional [without a trial] ...
without allowing the state an opportunity to show what kind of evidence creation-
scientists would present in classrooms if given the opportunity. The Supreme
Court therefore would have had no basis for a finding that the evidence would be
bogus or nonexistent.
JOHNSON, supra note 118, at 156-57.
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drawing conclusions from objective data, a process that education is sup-
posed to be all about.
Likewise, it is difficult to see any threat to religious liberty in telling
students they may silently pray or "meditate," a word that carries no neces-
sarily religious meaning. 20 To suggest that this language would somehow
"pressure" or "coerce" students to pray is ludicrous. Indeed, from the
Court's stress on purpose, it appears that the fact that the statute actually
mentioned prayer is not relevant to the Court's holding (except that it pro-
vides evidence of the forbidden legislative purpose). Thus, under Wallace, it
is plausible to argue that even a moment-of-silence statute that says nothing
to students about how to use their time, or a statute listing an exhaustive list
of alternatives (e.g., "meditate, think, pray, do nothing, become uncon-
scious") would be equally unconstitutional so long as the forbidden purpose
to endorse religion is present.
As one commentator has noted, Wallace and Edwards demonstrate that
"even a law that is concededly permissible in its substantive content, or that
potentially serves a legitimate secular objective, can nonetheless be constitu-
tionally infirm if the legislators who supported the measure expressed and
acted on religious motives." '121 It is possible to interpret Wallace and Ed-
wards in two ways: either the legislators' religious statements made the stat-
utes unconstitutional by causing the statutes to convey messages of endorse-
ment; or, the legislators' actual religious motives made the statutes unconsti-
tutional.'22 Either interpretation raises grave conflicts with the rights of re-
ligious believers to participate fully in the political process.
If the invalidating factor in Wallace and Edwards was the legislators'
statements in those cases, then those decisions "plainly penalize legislators
for expressing religious convictions and aspirations."'' 3 Legislators who
express their religious beliefs run the risk of having courts invalidate their
legislative work product as religious endorsements, a result that penalizes
both them and their constituents.'24 Professor Smith sees this conflict be-
tween legislators' speech rights and establishment as "inescapable" under a
120 "Meditation" is defined as "l.a. The act or process of meditating. b. A devotional
exercise of or leading to contemplation. 2. A contemplative discourse, usually on a reli-
gious or philosophical subject." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1121 (3d Col-
lege ed. 1992). To "meditate" in turn, is "to reflect on, to contemplate" or "to plan in
the mind; intend." Id.
2 Smith, Separation and the "Secular," supra note 3, at 994.
122 See id. at 994-95.
3 See id. at 994.
4 d. (quoting Rex Lee, The Religious Clauses: Problems and Prospects, 1986
B.Y.U. L. REv. 337, 343 ("It makes no sense to permit moments of silence in all states
that want to adopt them except those states unlucky enough to have legislators who said
the wrong things when the statute was debated.")).
1995]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
secularist interpretation of the Establishment Clause. 125 He cites, for in-
stance, Laurence Tribe, who believes that legislators should be able to ex-
press religious beliefs, but who also believes in a secularist interpretation of
the Establishment Clause that would ban government endorsements of reli-
gion.16 To reconcile these two positions, Tribe posits that politicians' reli-
gious expression is constitutional until at some point it becomes "govern-
mental speech."'2 7 But as Smith explains, this distinction is
conceptually dubious and practically unworkable.
Legislators' statements of religious support for a law express
the reasons that caused the law to be adopted, and thus will
inevitably be perceived as "governmental" expressions. To
classify these statements as "governmental," however, and
then to strike down the resulting legislation because of the
religious message it conveys, would penalize the legislators
for expressing their religious convictions-precisely the
result that Tribe purports to eschew.
21
The second explanation of Wallace and Edwards-that the statutes in
those cases were invalid solely because of the legislators' religious mo-
tives-is equally troubling. Religious believers (including even clergy mem-
bers) supposedly have a right to sit in state legislatures. 29 As Justice
Brennan put it: "Religionists no less than members of any other group en-
joy the full measure of protection afforded speech, association, and political
activity generally."'"3 But invalidating statutes because of the religious mo-
tives of the legislators who vote for those laws renders the protection of
which Justice Brennan spoke a nullity. Such an approach tells legislators
they may have religious beliefs, but they may not act on them. It conditions
holding elective office on the willingness to "suspend or ignore religious be-
liefs."'' This is a task that for many believers quite simply is impossible.
For those people, religious beliefs permeate every aspect of their lives.
3 2
Indeed religious belief, and the ability to put that belief into action for
society's benefit, is the reason many become involved in politics in the first
125 See id. at 993.
126 Id. at 995 (citing LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 14-
15 (2d ed. 1988)).
.27 TRIBE, supra note 126, §§ 14-15.
128 Smith, Separation and the "Secular," supra note 3.
29 See McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978) (invalidating Tennessee law that dis-
qualified ministers and priests of any denomination from holding public office).
3 Id. at 641 (Brennan, J., concurring).
131 See Smith, Separation and the "Secular," supra note 3, at 997.
132 See id. at 997 & n.234.
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place. To tell these people to put aside their beliefs when they legislate is to
tell them not to bother getting involved in public life.133
The secularist view of the Establishment Clause has affected more than
just legislators' speech and legislative activity. The Supreme Court has con-
sistently held that private religious speech is speech, entitled to the same
constitutional protection as any other speech.'34 Yet some have attempted
to use the Establishment Clause as an excuse to squelch private citizens'
religious expression on publicly owned property.'35 This has happened es-
pecially in this nation's public schools. The Senate Judiciary Committee re-
ported in 1984 that in the name of the Establishment Clause,
many school districts are permitting extracurricular nonreli-
gious speech but discriminating against extracurricular reli-
gious speech. These districts have banned student-initiated
extracurricular religious clubs, certain student community
service organizations and activities (including dances to ben-
efit the American Cancer Society), student newspaper articles
on religious topics, and student art with religious themes.
They have even prohibited students from praying together in
a car in a school parking lot, sitting together in groups of
two or more to discuss religious themes, and carrying their
personal Bibles on school property. Individual students have
been forbidden to say a blessing over their lunch or recite
the rosary silently on the school bus. 36
The attitude that the Establishment Clause prohibits even private reli-
gious expression on public property is not confined to public school admin-
istrators. For example, several cases have been brought to challenge the
133 Professor Smith notes that the type of reasoning used in Wallace and Edwards
could even lead to striking down laws based on constituents' religious convictions. "It
would seem anomalous to hold a law invalid if legislators adopted it on the basis of
their own religious convictions but not if they adopted it in response to their
constituents' religious convictions." Id. at 998. Taken to its logical extreme, this could
mean invalidating elections by voters whose religious views influence their choices. Id.
It is doubtful courts would go that far, but that is the inevitable logic of the position
that the Establishment Clause completely separates government from religion.
" See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269 (1981); Nietmotko v. Maryland,
340 U.S. 268, 272 (1951).
"' See, e.g., S. REP. No. 357, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12, reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2357-58; id. at 15-18, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2361-64; cases cit-
ed infra note 137.
136 Id. at 11-12, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2357-58; see also id. at 15-18, re-
printed in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2361-64 (citing other specific examples in which student
religious expression was banned, reprimanded, or ridiculed in public schools).
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government's tolerance of religious holiday displays or other religious dis-
plays on public property.'37 These cases did not involve special favors for
religion; rather, the displays challenged were on properties that were consid-
ered public fora for expressive activities.'
Because the Establishment Clause limits only government action, how
can it provide reason to banish citizens' religious speech from public proper-
ty? The argument for doing so goes like this: When government allows
religious speakers to use a public forum, those speakers receive a "benefit"
by receiving a platform from which to speak and the use of facilities main-
tained by state funds. This "benefit" allows the religious speaker to advance
his religious cause. Hence, the primary effect of allowing access to the reli-
gious speaker is said to be to advance religion. Moreover, by allowing reli-
gious speech on public property, the government is said to be unconstitu-
tionally endorsing the religious speech, which also has the effect of advanc-
ing religion.
The "benefit" argument is just a straightforward, if extreme, restatement
of the Everson "no aid" principle as interpreted by Justice Rutledge--"no
aid" means no aid, even if that "aid" is a benefit generally available to all
citizens-and recast in Lemon terms. The endorsement argument is a bit
trickier. It depends on the notion that the government endorses any speech it
fails to censor. In a country with a constitutional guarantee of free speech,
most would (or should) dismiss that notion as absurd; government has no
right to censor speech in the first place, so that its failure to censor certain
speech cannot be seen as endorsing that speech. 39 To counter this objec-
tion, however, the argument is given a slight twist: government may not
' See, e.g., Pinette v. Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd., 30 F.3d 675 (6th
Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 787 (1995); Chabbad-Lubavitch of Ga. v. Miller, 5
F.3d 1383 (1 1th Cir. 1993); Kreisner v. City of San Diego, 1 F.3d 775, 780-89 (9th Cir.
1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 690 (1994); Americans United for Separation of Church
and State v. City of Grand Rapids, 980 F.2d 1538, 1543 (6th Cir. 1992); Doe v. Small,
964 F.2d 611 (7th Cir. 1992).
'38 Under current Supreme Court Free Speech Clause doctrine, whether the govern-
ment may limit the use of public property depends on the type of forum that property
constitutes. In "traditional public fora" (areas such as streets, sidewalks, and parks that
traditionally have been devoted to free speech and assembly) and "designated public
fora" (property the government has intentionally designated for speech purposes), the
government generally may not exclude speech based on its content unless the exclusion
is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and the exclusion is narrowly drawn to
serve that interest; in "nonpublic fora," on the other hand, government generally may
not restrict access to the forum as long as the restriction is reasonable and viewpoint
neutral. See International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112 S. Ct.
2701, 2705-06 (1992). All the cases I have mentioned involved public fora. For a cri-
tique of the Court's forum analysis as overly-restrictive of free speech rights, see
Sekulow et al., supra note 96.
39 See Laycock, Equal Access, supra note 20, at 14; Sekulow et al., supra note 96.
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actually be endorsing what it does not censor, but observers in the general
public may not know that, or may not realize the speaker is actually a citi-
zen rather than the government. In the school situation, the argument takes
another twist: Adults may be able to understand that government does not
endorse all it fails to censor, but younger students may not yet have the
knowledge and maturity to understand that supposedly fine point of con-
stitutional law. 141 Under either argument, government's failure to censor
speech somehow is transformed magically into actual government endorse-
ment of that speech; a citizen's speech is thus transformed into state action.
Ultimately, both the primary-effect and perceived-endorsement argu-
ments must be based on an extreme secularist view of the Establishment
Clause, a view that requires such a complete separation of church from state
and religion from government that it allows no contacts (or almost no con-
tacts)141 between even private religious action and the state.' Such a
view is pernicious. It
blurs the line between state and private action and in the pro-
cess restricts religious freedom and free speech. It is one
thing to say government should not be in the business of
running churches or telling people how and when to practice
religion; it is quite another to attempt to justify censorship of
private religious speech or efforts to prevent people from
bringing their religious beliefs to bear on public policy. The
former position restricts government action and advances
private religious freedom; the latter position restricts private
action and cabins religious freedom and free speech by deny-
ing religious adherents the same rights to speak and petition
the government as other people have.'43
This view of establishment has been so well ingrained that until recently
lower federal courts had consistently ruled that allowing student religious
groups to meet on school property on the same terms as other student
groups violated the Establishment Clause.' A passage from the Second
'4 See Sekulow et al., supra note 96.
Taken to its logical extreme, such a strict view would require that a church could
not receive public police or fire protection or have its sidewalks repaired. I doubt that
anyone would take that view; the Supreme Court does not. See Widmar, 454 U.S. at
274-75.
,42 See Sekulow et al., supra note 96.
'4 Id.; see also Laycock, Equal Access, supra note 20, at 25-26 (arguing that the
"separation" metaphor "encourage[s] the misguided focus on the location of the speech
instead of the identity of the speaker").
See Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 741 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1984), vacated
on other grounds, 475 U.S. 534 (1986); Nartowicz v. Clayton County Sch. Dist., 736
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Circuit's decision in Brandon v. Board of Education45 demonstrates the
obsession courts commonly displayed in purging the schools of student reli-
gious activity so that other students would not think the school is endorsing
religion:
To an impressionable student, even the mere appearance of
secular involvement in religious activities might indicate that
the state has placed its imprimatur on a particular religious
creed. This symbolic inference is too dangerous to permit.
An adolescent may perceive "voluntary" school prayer in a
different light if he were to see the captain of the football
team, the student body president, or the leading actress in a
dramatic production participating in communal prayer meet-
ings in the "captive audience" setting of the school. 46
Note that this passage focuses entirely on student perception rather than
government action. There is no hint that actual coercion, sponsorship, en-
dorsement, or favoritism are necessary to violate the Establishment Clause.
"Mere appearance," "symbolic inference"-indeed, even the "threat" that
students will (heaven forbid!) follow the example of the football team's cap-
tain or the student body president-create such a "danger" that students
must be kept from meeting to pray on school property. In other words, stu-
dents are expected to keep their religious convictions to themselves while on
school property.
Fortunately, a series of Supreme Court decisions have in large part re-
buffed this treatment of religious speakers as second-class citizens. In
Widmar v. Vincent,'47 the Court held that when a state university creates
an open forum for student groups to meet, the Establishment Clause neither
requires nor justifies excluding religious groups from the forum.48 The
Court in Widmar rejected the university's argument that providing a forum
for religious groups had the primary effect of advancing religion, and held
that allowing the religious groups access to the forum would not unconstitu-
F.2d 646 (11 th Cir. 1984); Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Ind. Sch. Dist.,
669 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1982); Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1123 (1981). But see Mergens v. Board of Educ., 876
F.2d 1076, 1079-80 (8th Cir. 1989), affd, 496 U.S. 226 (1990). In Mergens, the Eighth
Circuit upheld the Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-74 (1988 & Supp. IV 1994),
which requires that schools not discriminate against student religious groups based on
the content of their speech, as not in violation of the Establishment Clause. Mergens,
876 F.2d at 1079-80.
145 635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1980).
4 Id. at 978 (emphasis added).
147 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
141 Id. at 277.
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tionally "endorse" religion. 49 In the course of upholding the Equal Access
Act, '5 the Court in Westside Community Schools v. Mergens5' extended
Widmar's reasoning to the context of speech in public secondary schools.
The plurality in Mergens noted that "there is a crucial difference between
government speech endorsing religion, which the Establishment Clause for-
bids, and private speech endorsing religion, which the Free Speech and Free
Exercise Clauses protect,""'5 and held that high school students were not
too immature or tender of mind to appreciate this distinction or the related
concept that government does not endorse everything it fails to censor.'53
Federal courts of appeals, relying on Mergens, have rejected the "perceived
endorsement" argument in rebuffing attempts by school administrators to
discriminate against religious speakers in junior high schools." 4
Given Mergens' rejection of the perceived endorsement argument, and
that argument's reliance on the alleged youth and immaturity of students in
the public school context, it should not be surprising that the argument has
not fared well outside the school context. In Lamb's Chapel v. Center
Moriches School District,'55 the Court held that discriminating against reli-
gious speakers in granting access to public facilities (in that case, a public
school after school hours) because of the religious viewpoint of their speech
violates the Free Speech Clause.'56 The defendants in Lamb 's Chapel cited
the Establishment Clause to justify their discrimination, relying in part on
' See id. at 270-75. The Court also rejected an argument by the university that the
state constitution's establishment clause required that it deny access to the forum, find-
ing that the possible state establishment clause violation in that case was not a suffi-
ciently compelling interest to override federal constitutional free speech rights. See id. at
276. While the Court did not decide the issue generally, the Supremacy Clause would
require that federal constitutional or statutory speech rights trump a state establishment
clause provision. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2. The Ninth Circuit in Garnett v. Renton
School District No. 403, 987 F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 1993), and the Third Circuit in Pope v.
East Brunswick Board of Education, 12 F.3d 1244, 1254 (3d Cir. 1993), each recog-
nized this principle. See generally Sekulow et al., supra note 96.
ISo See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
' 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
152 Id. at 250.
See id. ("The proposition that schools do not endorse everything they fail to cen-
sor is not complicated.") Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Scalia, concurred in the
judgment. Id. at 258 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy rejected any endorse-
ment test (perceived or otherwise) and instead reasoned that no Establishment Clause
violation would exist unless school officials coerced students to participate in religious
activity. See id. at 261-62 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
" See Good News/Good Sports Club v. School Dist. of Ladue, 28 F.3d 1501, 1508-
10 (8th Cir. 1994); Hedges v. Wauconda Community Sch. Dist. No. 118, 9 F.3d 1295,
1298-300 (7th Cir. 1993).
155 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993).
156 Id. at 2149.
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the perceived endorsement argument.' The Court had "no trouble" reject-
ing the defendants' argument.'58
Lower federal courts have followed the Supreme Court's lead. In fact, in
a series of cases involving religious displays in public fora, the federal
courts of appeals have been more emphatic than the Supreme Court has
been in rejecting the notion that fear of perceived endorsement of religion
either requires or justifies excluding religious expression from those
fora.'59 The courts of appeals' cases recognize that to censor or discrimi-
nate against private citizens' religious speech because of fear of perceived
endorsement "is at war with the free speech clause."'60 The perceived en-
dorsement argument smuggles something akin to the long-rejected
"heckler's veto"'' back into free speech jurisprudence. Like the heckler's
veto, this "obtuse observer's veto"'62 allows religious speakers' free speech
rights to depend on others' perceptions. But as one federal judge has put it:
"Just as bellicose bystanders cannot authorize the government to silence a
speaker, so ignorant bystanders cannot make censorship legitimate.' 63
"Private errors do not justify public discrimination against speech."'" 4
The perceived endorsement argument's war with the Free Speech Clause
is really a war with public manifestations of religion, since government "en-
dorsements" (perceived or otherwise) of other ideas (e.g., condom distribu-
tion to school students) are not normally thought by the argument's propo-
nents to raise any constitutional concerns.165 This war is a manifestation of
'5 Id. at 2148.
58 See id. Specifically, the Court stated that given the facts there was "no realistic
danger that the community would think that the District was endorsing religion or any
particular creed, and any benefit to religion or to the Church would have been no more
than incidental." Id.
'9 See cases cited supra note 138. But see Chabbad-Lubavitch of Vt. v. City of
Burlington, 936 F.2d 109 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that private religious displays in pub-
lic fora violate the Establishment Clause because of the possibility of perceived govern-
ment endorsement of religion); Kaplan v. City of Burlington, 891 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir.
1989) (same); Smith v. County of Albemarle, 895 F.2d 953 (4th Cir. 1990) (same).
"~ Sekulow et al., supra note 96.
.6 See Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 133 n.1 (1966); Hedges, 9 F.3d at 1299
(citing Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978)). The heckler's veto would allow
police to squelch an unpopular speaker because his speech may make the crowd unruly.
Such police action is impermissible; instead, "[t]he police must permit the speech and
control the crowd." Id.
162 Doe v. Small, 964 F.2d 611, 630 (7th Cir. 1992) (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
The Sixth Circuit has labeled the perceived endorsement argument the "ignoramus's ve-
to." Americans United for Separation of Church and State v. City of Grand Rapids, 980
F.2d 1538, 1553 (6th Cir. 1992); see also Pinette v. Capitol Square Review and Adviso-
ry Bd., 30 F.3d 675, 679 (6th Cir. 1994).
163 Hedges, 9 F.3d at 1299-300.
"6 Small, 964 F.2d at 630 (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
165 Professor McConnell has noted the bias against religion, present even in Justice
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the attitude that religion is "divisive" and therefore must be kept private, lest
the public manifestations offend and cause strife. The concern with "divi-
siveness" runs through Establishment Clause jurisprudence since
Everson.' Lemon picked up on the theme, explaining that while vigorous
and partisan political division are "normal and healthy manifestations of our
democratic system of government, [the] potential divisiveness [caused by
religion] is a threat to the normal political process." '67
Talk about divisiveness is really just a way of disguising hostility to-
ward believers who take their faith seriously enough to bring it with them
into their public lives. It is a way of telling those believers: "Believe if you
wish, but do it in private." The hoped-for consequences of this privatization
are that
[f]aith communities will more likely be loose associations of
the already converted, and attempts at unified public action
will be stymied not only by the overt entrance barriers
thrown up by the Court, but by the believer's own sense that
public religion "imposes" one's "values" on others-values
O'Connor's actual endorsement test, which focuses on whether government action sends
a message of approval or disapproval of one's religion:
For example, when the New York public schools train their teenage pupils in the
use of condoms, this plainly creates an appearance of 'disapproval' of a tenet of
the Roman Catholic Church .... But there is no "religion" of condom advocacy
on the other side-nothing but a particular secular view regarding public health
and sexual hygiene. To solve difficulties of this sort, attorneys for traditionalist
parents have tried to portray secular ideology as the religion of "secular human-
ism," but this strategy has been a failure.
McConnell, Religious Freedom, supra note 8, at 152. McConnell also notes the case of
Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of Education, 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987), in
which the Sixth Circuit rejected parents' claims that particular textbooks, read as a
whole, denigrated their religion and therefore violated their right to free exercise of reli-
gion. Id. at 152-53. Mozert also illustrates the bias inherent in the "endorsement" test:
"If enforced exposure to materials denigrating one's religion does not communicate a
'message of disapproval,' I cannot imagine what would." Id. at 153.
" As Professor Bradley notes:
Justice Jackson opined in Everson that the first amendment "above all" was de-
signed to "keep bitter religious controversy out of public life" by denying access
to public influence.... Justice Black, author of the majority opinion in Everson,
wrote in 1968 that the establishment clause "was written on the assumption that
state aid to religion.., generates discord, disharmony, hatred, and strife among
our people."..... Even Justice Harlan, normally not easily alarmed, observed in
1970 that "political fragmentation on sectarian lines must be guarded against" and
expressly deputized "voluntarism" and "neutrality" as humble servants of this par-
amount concern.
Bradley, Dogmatomachy, supra note 29, at 301-02 (citations omitted).
167 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622.
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that the believer has no reason to expect will be welcome in
others' lives.'68
Those who favor this privatization effort likely are acting with sincere
motives. But as somebody who believes religious beliefs have a positive
influence on society, culture, and politics, and as one who believes religious
people can get along and work for common causes in the culture and politi-
cal system without compromising their deeply-held doctrinal differences69
I find this privatization effort disturbing. Cases such as Widmar, Mergens,
and Lamb's Chapel, by rebuffing the perceived endorsement argument as
applied to religious speech, are encouraging because they contravene the
trend toward marginalization of religion as an aspect of public life.
One ought not raise false hope, however. Even within Widmar, Mergens,
and Lamb's Chapel, there are disconcerting signs that the Court has not yet
abandoned the notion that it must keep in check public manifestations of the
religious world view, and that the Lemon test plays no small role in this
effort. In Mergens, for instance, the plurality could have rejected the per-
ceived endorsement argument as incompatable with the Free Speech Clause.
That incompatability exists no matter how old the students are; if students
have speech rights, then those rights should not depend on others' percep-
tions."' Instead, the Court based its decision in Mergens in part on the
premise that secondary school students are mature enough to understand that
the government does not endorse everything that it does not censor. 7' By
failing to reject the perceived endorsement argument outright as repugnant
to the Free Speech Clause, the Court gave at least some credence to the no-
tion that there are situations in which government may allow an "obtuse
observer's veto" to censor religious speech in public schools.'72
168 Bradley, Dogmatomachy, supra note 29, at 314.
169 For example, I have publicly endorsed the accord, CATHOLICS AND EVANGELI-
CALS TOGETHER: THE CHRISTIAN MISSION IN THE THIRD MILLENNIUM (1992), reprinted
in FOURNIER, supra note 16, app. The accord is a statement of common principle signed
by both Catholics and Evangelical Christians. It honestly assesses the doctrinal differ-
ences between the groups, but goes on to set forth a theological and sociological foun-
dation for how Evangelicals and Catholics can act together for the common cause of
Jesus Christ and the restoration of American society and culture.
170 For general discussions regarding this issue, see Sekulow et al., supra note 96;
Laycock, Equal Access, supra note 20, at 51-52.
1 See Mergens, 496 U.S. at 250-51; see also Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2148
(finding "no realistic danger that the community would think that the [d]istrict was en-
dorsing religion").
172 To allow such a notion to prevail would be tragic. One commentator has sagely
noted that under the perceived endorsement approach
[a] young Martin Luther King, Jr. would have to avoid religious references and
themes during a high school speech class. A young Thomas Aquinas should wait
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This term the Court has an opportunity to decide in Capital Square Re-
view and Advisory Board v. Pinette' 3 whether the perceived endorsement
test retains any vitality. In Pinette, the Ku Klux Klan sought to display a
Latin cross during the Christmas season in a publicly owned square on
which the Ohio statehouse was located.'74 The square was a public fo-
rum.'75 The Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board, which had the
authority to regulate the square, denied permission, and the Klan sought an
injunction.'76 The Board defended by asserting that the location of the
cross in front of the statehouse on the square "would lead a reasonable
observer to conclude that the State of Ohio endorsed Christianity.""'
The Sixth Circuit forcefully rejected the Board's perceived endorsement
argument, holding that "private religious speech in a public forum does not
violate the Establishment Clause."'' That some may mistakenly conclude
that the government endorses the private speech does not matter because
"[t]he freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution cannot depend upon the fan-
ciful perceptions of some hypothetical dolt."'7
How the Court will decide Pinette is open to speculation. If the Court
decides consistently with its decisions in Widmar, Mergens, and Lamb's
Chapel, it should reject the perceived endorsement test and affirm the Sixth
Circuit's conclusion that "[iun a public forum, the religious content of pri-
vate speech is absolutely irrelevant for First Amendment [free speech] pur-
poses."'80 Perhaps the Court granted certiorari in Pinette to reject the per-
ceived endorsement test once and for all. But the Court's previous failures
to reject the test outright leaves room for doubt. Justice Stevens already has
indicated at least some sympathy for the Board's argument.' It is possi-
until college to begin exploring the nature of God in his writings, and a young
Mozart should save his Mass in C Major for Sunday. In this way, young souls are
silenced, some never exploring the mysteries of life, eternity, liberty, justice, and
equality-mysteries of which they have had only a taste.
Fischer, supra note 8, at 348.
1 30 F.3d 675 (6th Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 787 (1995).
174 Id. at 676.
" See id. at 676-77, 678.
176 Id. at 676.
'77 Id. at 678. As part of its argument, the Board asserted that "a cross is a powerful-
ly religious symbol that cannot be 'sanitized' through the ameliorating secular gloss as-
sociated with the Christmas holiday." Id. To this argument, which neatly sums up the
secularist mindset, the court appropriately responded that "[u]ntil today, we had not
thought that there would be any circumstances under which it could seriously be argued
that the United States Constitution requires that religious speech be 'sanitized."' Id.
7 Id. at 680.
179 Id. at 679.
10 Id. at 680.
"' Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 114 S. Ct. 626, 626-27
(1993) (Stevens, Circuit Justice, in chambers denying stay of injunction) ("Whether or
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ble the Court may apply the perceived endorsement test and hold that in
some circumstances the Establishment Clause provides a proper excuse for
censoring a citizen's religious speech.182
Another disconcerting sign for religious speech rights is the strange
statement in Widmar, repeated in Mergens, that "[a]t least in the absence of
empirical evidence that religious groups will dominate [an] open forum,...
the advancement of religion would not be the forum's 'primary effect."'" 83
What exactly does this mean? Does it mean that if believers work harder
than others in taking advantage of an open forum, the Court reserves the
right to put those speakers back in their proper place? The idea that reli-
gious speech in a public forum may be regulated if religious speakers
through their own efforts (and, perhaps, indifference by other speakers) be-
come the predominant voice in the forum implicitly tells believers: "You
may speak out, but don't speak too much or be too persuasive." It seems
nothing more than a means for the Court to ensure that allegedly "divisive"
religious speech does not get out of hand-that religious ideals and beliefs
do not make too much of an intrusion into the public square.
One also cannot ignore that even after Widmar, Mergens, and Lamb's
Chapel, the assault on public manifestations of religion continues. School
districts have adopted strained readings of the Equal Access Act to avoid
allowing student religious clubs to meet on school property. At least one of
those attempts has received the blessing of a federal district court.'84 An-
not [the Board's] legal position is sound (and my opinion in Allegheny County v. Amer-
ican Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573 (1989), explains why I am not unresponsive to
their arguments), [it] must shoulder the burden of persuading me that irreparable harm
will ensue if I do not grant their application.") (citation omitted).
182 One hopes that the fact that the Ku Klux Klan sought to erect the cross will not
have any bearing on the Court's decision in Pinette. The district court in Pinette
summed up both the feelings of most reasonable persons (including myself) concerning
the Klan and the role those feelings should play in determining the Klan's right to free
speech:
It is ironic and in the most literal sense diabolical that a group bearing this name
would seek to publicly display the symbol of Jesus of Nazareth known to Chris-
tians and non-Christians alike as the Prince of [P]eace. It should be obvious, how-
ever, that the constitutional right of freedom of speech would be meaningless if it
did not apply equally to all groups, popular and unpopular alike.
Pinette v. Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd., 844 F. Supp. 1182, 1188 (S.D.
Ohio 1993).
183 Mergens, 496 U.S. at 252; Widmar, 454 U.S. at 275.
's Specifically, in Ceniceros v. Board of Trustees of the San Diego Unified School
District, No. 93-1015-GT, slip op., (S.D. Cal. 1993) (appeal pending), the district court
interpreted the term "instructional time" in the Act to mean "time before the school day
begins or after the school day ends." Id. at 5. This interpretation allowed a school board
to evade the Act and to avoid allowing religious groups to meet by setting aside activity
periods for student groups to meet during the school day, even if no actual classroom
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other district court has held that the Establishment Clause compelled school
officials to censor a student's valedictory speech because of its religious
content.'85 Challenges have been brought against sex education programs
teaching abstinence because the teaching of abstinence allegedly supports
and promotes a particular religious view (as if handing out condoms does
not). '6 In DeKalb County, Georgia, students were told they could not pass
out Christian literature in school or on the public sidewalk in front of the
school.IS72192
Other examples could be cited.'88 The point is that almost all of these
examples depend on a view that the Establishment Clause mandates an es-
sentially secular public order into which the intrusion of religious thoughts,
ideas, and values must be kept to a minimum. This is the view that rigorous
application of the Lemon test furthers. It is also a view that is inconsistent
with the historical meaning of the Establishment Clause.
IV. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT.
The majority decision and Justice Rutledge's dissent in Everson, which
are the direct forbears of Lemon and its progeny, purported to base their
expansive view of the Establishment Clause on the historical circumstances
surrounding the Clause's enactment."9 But Everson's modem conception
of the Establishment Clause as mandating completely separate realms of
religion and government and prohibiting the state from giving aid or encour-
agement of any sort to religion-not to mention even more recent efforts to
prevent government from even allowing private religious speech on govern-
ment property-is not supported by the Clause's language or history. As one
instruction occurs during those periods. This interpretation of "instructional time" is not
compelled by the Act, which defines "instructional time" as "time set aside before actu-
al classroom instruction begins or after actual classroom instruction ends," and is incon-
sistent with the Supreme Court's command in Mergens to avoid interpreting the Act in
a way that would make it a nullity. For a critical discussion of Ceniceros, see Sekulow
et al., supra note 96, part I.C.2.
185 See Guidry v. Broussard, 897 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1990), in which the court of ap-
peals affirmed on procedural grounds a district court's decision dismissing a student's
42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim alleging that school officials had violated her free speech rights
by censoring her valedictory speech. Id. at 183. The district court held that the Estab-
lishment Clause compelled the censorship. Id. For a discussion of whether school offi-
cials have any justification for censoring a religious valedictory speech, see generally
Sekulow et al., supra note 96.
186 See PAT ROBERTSON, THE TURNING TIDE 310 (1993).
187 See id. at 311. For a general discussion of public school students' rights to distrib-
ute religious literature on campuses, see generally Sekulow et al., supra note 96, part
II.B.
18s See ROBERTSON, supra note 186, at 307-12.
189 See supra note 75.
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scholar noted in 1949: "Justice Rutledge sold his brethren a bill of goods
when he persuaded them that the 'establishment of religion' clause of the
First Amendment was intended to rule out all governmental 'aid to all reli-
gions. "l90
Everson's secular imperative is not a natural reading of the Establish-
ment Clause's language. The First Amendment nowhere mentions "separa-
tion" or "walls" or "fences" or anything else of the sort. The Establishment
Clause does not state "government shall be completely separate from reli-
gion" or "religion shall have nothing to do with government" or that "Con-
gress shall give no aid or encouragement of any kind to religion." Instead,
the Clause states: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion .... ,9
Note that the Clause prohibits "Congress" from acting. The Establish-
ment Clause prohibits certain government action. Right away, that should
eliminate the "perceived endorsement" argument or any other argument that
would magically transform a private citizen's religious speech into state ac-
tion.92
'9 Edward S. Corwin, The Supreme Court as National School Board, 14 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 16 (1949).
'9' U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1 (emphasis added).
9 While on its face the Clause prohibits only the federal government, i.e., Congress,
from acting, the Supreme Court has held that the Establishment Clause applies to the
states by way of incorporation through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.
See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1946); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319
U.S. 105 (1943). In truth, in its doctrine of incorporation the Supreme Court did vio-
lence to history. The Congress that was roughly contemporaneous with the passage of
the Fourteenth Amendment specifically voted down what is known as the "Blaine
Amendment," named after Senator James G. Blaine of Ohio. See John S. Baker, Jr.,
The Religion Clauses Reconsidered: The Jaffree Case, 15 CUMB. L. REv. 125, 137
(1984). That amendment, first proposed in 1875, would explicitly have prohibited state
laws "respecting an establishment of religion." Id. This indicates at least that those pro-
posing the amendment did not believe disestablishment applied to the states even after
the Fourteenth Amendment's adoption. See BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS,
supra note 47, at 10. Only by judicial fiat which ignored clear congressional action was
the incorporation of the Establishment Clause brought about. In any event, the Due Pro-
cess Clause prohibits states from depriving persons of "life, liberty, or property" with-
out due process of law. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 3. The theory behind incor-
poration is that the word "liberty" encompasses certain provisions in the Bill of Rights.
See 3 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §
15.6, at 422 (1992). But if that is so, it is difficult to see how purely symbolic state ac-
tions that do not coerce religious belief or action, or payment in support of reli-
gion-i.e., actions that do not deprive anybody of liberty in any meaningful sense of the
word-could be prohibited. See American Civil Liberties Union v. City of St. Charles,
794 F.2d 265, 270 (7th Cir. 1986) (noting the "semantic as well as historical difficulty
in equating a law aiding religion, or even a particular denomination, to a law depriving
persons of their religious liberty").
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Moreover, the term "establishment of religion" had (and has) a tradition-
ally accepted meaning. According to Blackstone: "By establishment of reli-
gion is meant the setting up or recognition of a state church, or at least the
conferring upon one church of special advantages which are denied to oth-
ers."'93 As Professor Bradley has noted, even modem dictionaries define
"establishment" as "a state church."' 94 In the late eighteenth century, as
now, the common sense of the term "establishment of religion" donnoted a
church that the state set up or to which government gave special favors that
it denied to other churches. In no way can the term's plain meaning be
stretched to prohibit any aid or encouragement to religion in general, much
less a requirement that the religious world view be kept out of politics and
government.
The historical context surrounding the proposal and ratification of the
Establishment Clause is instructive as to its meaning. Some have argued that
history does not support the view that the Establishment Clause requires
only that government not discriminate among sects in giving out aid.'95
That may or may not be so. But there is no question that the history does
not support the Everson "no aid" position, and it certainly does not support
the proposition that the First Amendment requires that religion be left com-
pletely private, completely separated from government and politics.
Both the majority opinion in Everson and Justice Rutledge's dissent pur-
port to be based on history. However, the sum of their history essentially
boils down to three words: Madison, Jefferson, and Virginia. Justice Black's
majority opinion, after recounting a history of religious intolerance in the
colonies that shocked "the freedom-loving colonials into a feeling of abhor-
As for perceived endorsement, one can draw a parallel with due process cases con-
cerning the issue of state action. Private action does not violate the Due Process Clause.
The fact that the state allows such action is not state action. Likewise, the fact that the
state allows private speech endorsing, promoting, or supporting religion should not be
sufficient state action to violate the Establishment Clause. See Sekulow et al., supra
note 96.
'9' 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *296; see also Bradley, Imagining the
Past, supra note 47, at 833; Corwin, supra note 190, at 16 (quoting THOMAS COOLEY,
PRINCIPALS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 224-25 (3d ed. 1898)).
... Bradley, Imagining the Past, supra note 47, at 833 (citing III THE OXFORD ENG-
LISH DICTIONARY 298 (1933); WEBSTER'S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 778 (3d
ed. 1981)); see also THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 466 (2d college ed. 1991)
(defining "establishment" as "an established church" and "established church" as "a
church that is officially recognized and given support as a national institution by a gov-
ernment").
' See Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2668-76 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring);
see also Douglas Laycock, "Nonpreferential" Aid to Religion: A False Claim About
Original Intent, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 875 (1986) [hereinafter Laycock,
"Nonpreferential" Aid].
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rence,"'196 effectively reduced the First Amendment to the culmination of a
struggle led by Madison and Jefferson in 1784 and 1785 to defeat a bill in
the Virginia legislature that would have required general assessments to aid
Christian teachers. In response to the bill, Madison wrote his Memorial and
Remonstrance,97 which presented Madison's arguments against the assess-
ment. The bill was defeated, and in its place the legislature enacted the Vir-
ginia Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, drafted by Jefferson.'98 That
bill provided:
[N]o man shall be compelled to frequent or support any reli-
gious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever, nor shall be
enforced, restrained, molested, or burthened in his body or
goods, nor shall otherwise suffer on account of his religious
opinions or belief; but that all men shall be free to profess,
and by argument to maintain, their opinions in matters of
religion .... 199
To make a long story short, Black's Everson opinion "essentially reduced
the religion clauses to a federal codification of' Jefferson's bill.2"' In
Black's view, that bill-and hence the First Amendment-was summed up
in Jefferson's comment in his letter to the Danbury Baptist Association that
the Establishment Clause was meant to erect "a wall of separation between
church and State. ' 0'
Justice Rutledge, in Professor Bradley's words, "pursued the Virginia
analogy with still more vigor. 202 His analysis differs from the
196 Everson, 330 U.S. at 11. See generally id. at 8-11.
'9' James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, re-
printed in Everson, 330 U.S. 63-72 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
198 See Everson, 330 U.S. at 12-13.
'9 The Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, reprinted in BRADLEY, CHURCH-
STATE RELATIONSHIPS, supra note 47, app. I, at 149-50; see also Everson, 330 U.S. at
11-13. Others have noted that both the Memorial and Remonstrance and the Bill for
Establishing Religious Freedom focus entirely on coercive practices; thus, even those
documents do not support interpreting the Establishment Clause to prohibit noncoercive
aid or support for religion. See American Jewish Congress v. City of Chicago, 827 F.2d
120, 135-36 (7th Cir. 1987); Michael W. McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of
Establishment, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 933, 938-39 (1986) [hereinafter McConnell,
Coercion].
200 Bradley, Imagining the Past, supra note 47, at 832; see Everson, 330 U.S. at 12-
16; BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS, supra note 47, at 3.
20 Everson, 330 U.S. at 16 (citation omitted); see supra note 1 and accompanying
text.
202 BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS, supra note 47, at 3. To confirm that
assessment, see generally Everson, 330 U.S. at 31-42 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
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majority's mainly in that it focused more on Madison than on Jefferson.
Indeed, Rutledge went so far as to call the Amendment "the compact and
exact summation" of Madison's views."3 According to Justice Rutledge,
the Amendment reflected Madison's "unyielding"2" view that all "state
support, financial or other, of religion in any guise, form, or degree" be
prohibited."5
The most striking feature of both Everson opinions is their almost com-
plete equation of the Establishment Clause's meaning with the views Madi-
son and Jefferson had expressed in fighting general assessments in Virginia
four years before the Establishment Clause was even proposed. Although
Justice Black asserted that the colonists' general abhorrence toward the pre-
vailing practices concerning church-state relations prompted the Establish-
ment Clause, the only source Justice Black cited for this proposition is a
1774 letter by Madison to a friend concerning the imprisonment of several
men in Virginia for "publishing their religious sentiments. 2 6 The excerpt
from the quoted letter did not refer to any general abhorrence to such perse-
cution, and neither Justice Black nor Justice Rutledge cited any other evi-
dence to support the view that Madison's supposed opposition to such
things as general assessments and blasphemy laws was widespread. As
Professor Bradley has noted, "[t]he Court [in Everson] provided no founda-
tion for this historical convergence" of the Establishment Clause with Jeffer-
son and Madison's view, except for Madison's involvement in both the
drafting of the First Amendment and the Virginia general assessment
struggle."7
It is simply wrong to take Jefferson's or Madison's views of church-
state relations as the final word on the meaning of the Establishment Clause.
Jefferson, of course, was out of the country during the time the Clause was
drafted, proposed, debated, and ratified,2 8 and his "wall" statement was
made years after the Establishment Clause's ratification. More to the point,
the decision regarding disestablishment, that is, the decision regarding the
proper role the federal government was to take and the power the federal
government was to have in matters regarding religion, was neither
Jefferson's nor Madison's to make. The Establishment Clause did not be-
come effective upon proposal; rather, the Clause had to survive the commit-
tee process, be approved by both houses of Congress, and then-most im-
portantly-be ratified by three-quarters of the states. Moreover, it was the
Amendment's language, and not any particular legislator's belief about the
203 Everson, 330 U.S. at 31 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
204 Id. at 37 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
203 Id. at 33 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
206 See id. at I In.9.
207 BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS, supra note 47, at 3.
208 See id. at 78.
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language, that is binding. 9
Madison's views regarding the proper relationship between church and
state could be relevant in shedding light upon what the Amendment's words
mean. But whatever light might be shed must be verified historically. To
equate the First Amendment's meaning with Madison's views, one would
have to establish that those who drafted, proposed, and (most importantly)
ratified the Amendment understood that the language in the Amendment
embodied those views, and that those persons adopted the Amendment with
that understanding. In other words, one would have to conclude, given that
the Establishment Clause's text does not compel the conclusion, that it was
commonly understood that the Amendment's meaning embodied Madison's
views (which, according to Justice Rutledge, required "strict separa-
tion"),2"0 and that Congress would have passed and the states would have
ratified such an Amendment.
Justice Rutledge, however, distorted Madison's religious views. Madison
was trained in theology at Princeton University under the devout clergyman
and later congressman, John Witherspoon."' Madison's struggle for reli-
gious freedom was vigorously supported by Virginia's Baptists, my forbears
among them, who had suffered repeated indignites at the hands of the estab-
lished Anglican Church."' Madison went from the Constitutional Conven-
tion to a seat in the newly formed House of Representatives. His first offi-
cial duty in that chamber was to chair the committee which selected a Chris-
tian Chaplain to lead the assembled representatives in daily prayer.3 It is
inconceivable that the author of the First Amendment was so ignorant of the
Constitution that he would begin his elected duties by violating it. Rather,
reason would tell us that the founding Congress considered public prayers,
paid for with public funds, to be completely in harmony with the clear
meaning of the First Amendment, and not in anyway an impermissible "es-
209 Madison himself noted:
As a guide in expounding and applying the provisions of the Constitution, the de-
bates and incidental decisions of the Convention can have no authoritative charac-
ter .... The legitimate meaning of the Instrument must be derived from the text
itself; or if a key is to be sought elsewhere, it must not be in the opinions or in-
tentions of the Body which planned and proposed the Constitution, but in the
sense attached to it by the people in their respective State Conventions where it
recd. all the Authority which it possesses.
Id. at 111 (quoting C. WOLFE, THE RISE OF MODERN JUDICIAL REVIEW 34 (1986)); see
also Corwin, supra note 190, at 13.
20 As we have already seen, the language of the Clause does not compel that conclu-
sion. See supra notes 189-92 and accompanying text.
21 See JOHN EIDSNOE, CHRISTIANITY AND THE CONSTITUTION 95 (1987).
2,2 See BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS, supra note 47, at 40 (noting Vir-
ginia Baptists' opposition to the general assessment proposed in Virginia).
213 See ROBERT L. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE-HISTORICAL FACT
AND CURRENT FICTION 23 (Baker Book House Co. reprint 1988) (1982).
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tablishment of religion."
In any event, it is practically inconceivable that late eighteenth-century
Americans would have ratified an amendment to the Constitution that would
have required religion to be kept strictly separate from government or that
would have prohibited any aid or encouragement for religion. American
thinking at the time was "pervasively religious ... more specifically, perva-
sively Protestant." '214 Americans of the time generally saw religion, and in
particular Protestant Christianity, as essential to liberty and republican gov-
ernment.' 5 "Thus, '[t]he vast majority of Americans ... automatically ex-
pected that government would uphold the commonly agreed on Protestant
ethos and morality.' 2 1 6
Religion suffused the thinking of eighteenth-century Americans, and
formed the basis for most political discourse of the period. 217 This is evi-
dent, as we have seen, in the Declaration of Independence. 2 '8 As Professor
Smith notes, the Bill of Rights itself also reflects our nation's Judeo-Chris-
tian heritage.2 9 But, ironically, this suffusion of religious thought in politi-
cal thinking is perhaps most evident in arguments defending individual reli-
gious freedom. Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance depends on explicit-
214 Smith, Separation and the "Secular," supra note 3, at 966; see also BRADLEY,
CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS, supra note 47, at 122 (noting "an indelible fusion of
nondenominational Protestantism and republican government in the early American
mind").
211 See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text; see also BERMAN, supra note 47,
at 210-11 ("[T]he authors of the Constitution, including those who were personally
skeptical of the truth of traditional theistic religion, did not doubt that the vitality of the
legal system itself depended on the vitality of religious faith, and more particularly, of
the Protestant. Christian faith that predominated in the new American Republic.");
BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS, supra note 47, at 123 (noting that Madison
maintained in The Federalist that "liberty presupposed a virtuous citizenry").
"16 Smith, Separation and the "Secular," supra note 3, at 966 (quoting THOMAS
CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF
THE FIRST AMENDMENT 219 (1986)).
217 See id. at 967. As Professor Smith notes, even
the thinking of "enlightened" Americans like Jefferson and Thomas Paine on mat-
ters such as natural history, morality, and politics was grounded in a religious
world view. Although this world view diverged from orthodox Christianity, it was
religious in what seems (at least in retrospect) a not so untraditional sense. Nearly
all the important conclusions in Jeffersonian thought depended on a belief in a
divine Creator or on the moral teachings of Jesus.
Id. (citing DANIEL BOORSTIN, THE LOST WORLD OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 27-56, 151-66,
243-48 (1948)).
218 See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text; see also Smith, Separation and the
"Secular," supra note 3, at 967.
219 See Smith, Separation and the "Secular," supra note .3, at 967 (citing Donald A.
Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development: Part I. The
Religious Liberty Guarantee, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1381, 1404 (1967)).
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ly religious grounds in arguing against General Assessments."2 ' Jefferson's
Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom is also explicitly theological; in-
deed, it is "an exercise in religious persuasion. ' The preamble's first
sentence declares: "Almighty God hath created the mind free, and manifest-
ed his Supreme will that free it shall remain.2 22 It goes on to state that at-
tempts to influence the mind by legal coercion "are a departure from the
plan of the holy author of our religion, who being Lord of both body and
mind, yet chose not to propagate it by coercions on either.
223
According to these excerpts, then: (1) God exists; (2) He is Almighty;
(3) He created man; and (4) He has "Supreme Will," is the "author of our
religion," and "chose" how to propogate that religion, all of which can be
taken to imply that not only is God "Almighty," but that He also has certain
attributes that indicate He is a personal God who chose to create. In other
words, the Bill states many of the rudiments of theistic religion, all in an
official promulgation of the Virginia legislature. Whether Jefferson believed
all he wrote in the Bill (or whether Madison believed all he wrote in the
Memorial and Remonstrance) is impossible to know. But even if not, the
fact that "Jefferson and Madison thought it necessary to defend religious
freedom on religious grounds" is an excellent indication of the religious
mindset of the general public at the time. 24 Moreover, it is an interesting
irony that if government "endorsement" of religion or a particular religious
view violates the Establishment Clause, the Bill to Establish Religious Free-
dom-from which Justice Black in Everson derived his interpretation of the
Establishment Clause-itself would violate the Establishment Clause. 5
The prevailing view was reflected more concretely in both state and na-
tional legislation before and after the First Amendment's ratification. The
Northwest Ordinance, enacted for the governance of the western territories
by the Confederation Congress in 1787, declared that "religion, morality,
and knowledge being necessary to good government and the happiness of
mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be encour-
aged." '226 Territorial governments under the ordinance's authority set up
means for supporting religion. 27 Several states had established churches at
that time, but even those that did not maintained general support and aid for
220 See id.
22 American Jewish Congress v. City of Chicago, 827 F.2d 120, 135 (7th Cir. 1987)
(Easterbrook, J., dissenting); see also Smith, Separation and the "Secular," supra note
3, at 967.
222 BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS, supra note 47, app. I, at 149.
223 See Cord, supra note 213, addendum 3.
224 See Smith, Separation and the "Secular," supra note 3, at 969 n.78 (emphasis
added).
25 See id. at 969 n.77; American Jewish Congress, 827 F.2d at 136.
226 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
22? See infra notes 269-76 and accompanying text.
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religion. 28
Particularly instructive are the situations in Pennsylvania, Delaware, and
New Jersey. While there is considerable debate among scholars about how
many states had established churches at the time the First Amendment was
proposed and ratified,229 there is little dispute that "Pennsylvania, New Jer-
sey, and Delaware 'never experienced any establishment of religion.' 2
30
Yet, despite the fact that "these ... states were self-consciously
nonestablishment from the day they were settled,... all aided, encouraged,
and sponsored Christianity, including providing direct material and financial
assistance to religious institutions and societies. 23' For example, Penn-
sylvania had laws punishing Sabbath breakers and those who blasphemed
"Almighty God, Christ Jesus, the Holy Spirit, or the Scripture of Truth. 232
Pennsylvania also granted tax exemptions to churches, and established trust-
eeships at state colleges and universities for religious clergy.233 In New
Jersey, which prohibited establishment in its constitution, the legislature was
authorized to appoint and maintain ministers, and "the assembly liberally
bestowed substantial land grants on religious societies ... 234 Like Penn-
sylvania, Delaware and New Jersey both punished Sabbath breakers and
blasphemers.23
Given the great emphasis that the Everson opinions place on the experi-
ence in Virginia, it also is instructive to look at some practices in that state.
Virginia formally disestablished the Anglican Church in 1786.236 Madison
is rightly regarded as a leader in the fight for disestablishment, and religious
liberty in general, in Virginia. Yet, on the very day that Madison introduced
Jefferson's Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, he also proposed a bill
providing penalties for Sabbath breakers.237 Both bills passed.238 In fact,
228 See generally BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS, supra note 47, at 19-57
(marshalling the data regarding the support for religion in the various states).
229 See id. at 20 (noting that "[w]hen twentieth-century commentators and justices
look for religious establishment at the time the Bill of Rights was enacted, they are not
sure how many [states with an established religion] there were in America").
230 Leonard Levy, No Establishment of Religion: The Original Understanding, in
LEONARD W. LEVY, JUDGMENTS: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
192 (1972); see also LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 25 (1986).
Bradley notes that this conclusion is "typical of historians' judgment." BRADLEY,
CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS, supra note 47, at 46.
231 BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS, supra note 47, at 46.
232 Id. at 48.
233 Id.
234 Id. at 51. Bradley notes that as land became scarce in the eighteenth century the
New Jersey legislature granted dispensations from the state's general ban on lotteries to
fund church construction. Id. Moreover, although not codified until 1851, tax exemp-
tions for churches and schools were "universally extended." Id.
231 Id. at 49-52.
236 Id. at 30-31, 40.
237 Smith, Separation and the "Secular," supra note 3, at 970 (citing Robert L. Cord,
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even during and after the struggle to disestablish the Anglican Church "no-
body in Virginia opposed all aid and encouragement to religion. 239
Throughout the 1776-1786 period, the legislature granted a
number of requests from religious organizations for lotteries
to fund church construction, where lotteries were otherwise
prohibited.... Before and after disestablishment in 1786,
the legislature continued to proclaim fast and thanksgiving
days and to pay for special sermons, and in 1777 it exempt-
ed the property ... of religious societies from taxation.24
Virginia's experience with education also indicates that the founding
generation did not think disestablishment and aid to religious institutions to
be mutually exclusive. In 1796, the legislature passed an act allowing coun-
ties to offer free schools.24' However, counties did not take advantage of
the enabling law; instead, a movement arose to charter private schools,
including sectarian and nondenominational Protestant schools. 42 Between
1777 and 1820, the legislature granted at least fifty charters.243 Charters al-
lowed schools, among other things, to raise funds by lotteries, which other-
wise were illegal.244 Moreover, religiously run schools received grants of
escheated lands, and even cash grants.245 Professor Bradley sums up the
situation in Virginia: "After a painfully self-conscious disestablishment, the
nonestablishment home state of Jefferson and Madison aided-through tax
exemptions, escheated lands, lottery dispensations, and cash
grants-sectarian and nondenominational Protestant schools."246
Given the religious mindset of most eighteenth-century Americans, the
Founding Intentions and the Establishment Clause: Harmonizing Accommodation and
Separation, 10 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 47, 49 (1987)).
238 Id.
239 BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS, supra note 47, at 40. "[N]ot even
Baptists [who opposed religious tests on theological grounds]-and not even Jeffer-
son-rejected the more general proposition that the state ought to foster and encourage
Christianity, if only (as for Jefferson) because it was an effective instrument of social
control." Bradley, No Religion Test, supra note 65, at 688 (citing WALTER BERNS, THE
FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 31 (1976)).
240 BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS, supra note 47, at 41.
241 Id. at 30.
242 Id.
243 Id.
244 Id.
245 Id. at 130-31.
246 Id. at 131. As Professor Bradley notes, even public education in the colonies dur-
ing the late 18th and early 19th centuries (where it existed) was explicitly religious. See
id. at 125-31.
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general belief that religion (specifically Protestant Christianity) was neces-
sary for republican government, and the general expectation that government
would (and should) promote Christianity (even in states that had disestab-
lished state churches and that had never had established churches in the first
place), it is dubious at best to suppose that Americans would have under-
stood the First Amendment's prohibition against laws "respecting an estab-
lishment of religion" as mandating a secular political society in which the
new government could not in some ways encourage, promote, or aid reli-
gion. It also is dubious to suppose that Congress would have proposed, or
that Americans would have ratified, such an amendment. 247
A look at the proposal and ratification processes bears this out. Madison,
who did not originally favor a bill of rights, proposed what is now the First
Amendment in May 1789 out of political expediency; he had promised
amendments as a sop to antifederalists and to Virginia voters, and he had to
deliver to save his political career and perhaps even the Constitution.248
Madison was not on a crusade to write his personal views regarding church-
state relationships (or what the Court in Everson considered to be his views)
into the Constitution. "The truth is that Madison's personal philosophy,
whatever that may have been, has nothing to do with the meaning of the
Establishment Clause. 249
It was vital to Madison that his proposals succeed. Therefore, he could
not afford to be controversial. Most, if not almost all, members of Congress
were hostile to Madison's personal views on church-state relations."'
Many of the important figures were committed to public aid to religion.
5
"[Tihe vast majority of the House certainly held distinctively un-Madisonian
247 Others have reached the same conclusion. See id. at 131 ("Not only did [the
Framers] not erect a wall of separation between religion and government, the givens in
their mental world mean they literally could not."); Smith, Separation and the "Secu-
lar," supra note 3, at 966 (arguing that "the separation of politics and religion, or of
government and religion" did not present 18th century Americans with "a genuine op-
tion" and that "Americans of the time could not seriously contemplate a thoroughly sec-
ular political culture from which religious beliefs, motives, purposes, rhetoric, and prac-
tices would be filtered out").
248 See BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS, supra note 47, at 85-86. Indeed,
the first draft of the Establishment Clause Madison proposed stated: "The civil rights of
none shall be abridged on account of religious belief or worship, nor shall any national
religion be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be in any man-
ner, or on any pretext, infringed." Id. at 87. Madison stated that the amendment re-
sponded to a fear that one sect, or one or two sects combined, may "establish a religion
to which they would compel others to conform." Id. at 87. Madison interpreted a later
draft that stated "no religion shall be established by law" to mean that Congress could
not establish a religion legally and compel people to observe it. See id. at 87-88.
249 Id. at 87.
250 Id. at 89.
251 See id.
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views. 252 As for the Senate,
[t]he considerable historical evidence reveals not a single
senator whose personal views were even close to Madison's
(much less those attributed to him by the Supreme
Court) .... [A] proposal that prohibited all aid, encourage-
ment, or support of religion would not have been milk and
water to them; it would have scandalized them. Such an
amendment would not have garnered two votes, much less
two-thirds.253
To make a long story short, Madison did not offer any extreme proposal
incorporating his views (or what the Supreme Court in Everson thought to
be his views) into the Establishment Clause.2 4 He never offered the Me-
morial and Remonstrance or the Bill for Establishing Religious Liberty as
explanations for the proposals he made, for any of the other versions of the
Amendment voted on in the House, or for the final version that Congress
passed and proposed to the states for ratification.255
What finally emerged from Congress is what we now know as the Es-
tablishment Clause: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion ... 256 That proposal had legal force only if ratified by
252 Id. at 90.
253 Id.
254 As one commentator has noted: "One need only read the amendment's history to
see that Madison worked as an advocate of sensible legislative compromise and not as
an advocate of incorporating Virginia's Statute of Religious Liberty as told in Everson."
Fischer, supra note 8, at 332. For a painstaking account of the Amendment's history in
Congress, see generally BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS, supra note 47, at
85-97. For a contrary view of the same evidence, concluding that the Establishment
Clause does prohibit even nonpreferential financial aid to religion, see Laycock,
"Nonpreferential" Aid, supra note 195, at 879-94.
255 See Corwin, supra note 190, at 13. As noted earlier, Madison offered explanations
for his original proposal and for a later proposal. James Madison, Memorial and
Remostrance Against Religious Assessments, reprinted in Everson v. Board of Educ.,
330 U.S. 1, 63-72 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). As Bradley notes: "[N]owhere in either
published or private debate during this period did Madison deviate from" the explana-
tions of the two proposals. BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS, supra note 47, at
88.
256 U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1. Justice Souter, in his concurring opinion in Lee v.
Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992), makes much of the drafting history that led to this
proposal in arguing for the proposition that the Establishment Clause does not allow
even nonpreferential aid to religion. The gist of his argument is that during the drafting
process, the House rejected several versions of the Amendment that would more clearly
have allowed nonpreferential aid. Id. at 2668-69 (Souter, J., concurring). The final ver-
sion that emerged from the House and was passed to the Senate stated that "Congress
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the states. The Court's theory in Everson was that "freedom loving colo-
nials" had become so chagrined at existing church-state practices that they
endeavored to root out those practices by completely separating religion
from government and prohibiting any aid to religion.257 Given the general
religious mindset of the American people and the prevalence of state aid to
religion (even, as noted, in states without established churches), the Court's
theory essentially was that in ratifying the First Amendment, the American
people effected a revolution in church-state relations.
As Professor Bradley notes, however, such revolutions are not normally
accompanied by silence.258 One would think that an amendment that re-
quired, as Justice Rutledge put it, "a complete and permanent separation of
the spheres of religious activity and civil authority by comprehensively for-
bidding every form of public aid or support for religion" '259 would have
drawn some public controversy. Yet, for the most part, the "ratification of
shall make no law establishing Religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, nor
shall the rights of conscience be infringed." Id. at 2669 (Souter, J., concurring) (empha-
sis added). The Senate rejected this version, and several others, before finally settling
on this language: "Congress shall make no law establishing articles of faith or a mode
of worship, or prohibiting the free exercise of religion." Id. The final version, "Con-
gress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion .. . ," was a House-
Senate compromise in which, according to Justice Souter, the House conferees won out.
Id. Given that the Framers had rejected much more explicit language that would have
allowed nonpreferential aid, Justice Souter concludes that the nonpreferentialist position
requires the premise that the Framers were simply bad drafters. See id. at 2669-70
(Souter, J., concurring); see also Laycock, Nonpreferential Aid, supra note 195, at 879-
83.
My concern is not to establish the nonpreferentialist position; it is only to show that
the Establishment Clause does not mandate a completely secular political society or pro-
hibit all government aid or encouragement for religion. However, I note that the draft-
ing history argument is a two-edged sword. Besides rejecting language that would more
clearly have stated the non-preferentialist position, Congress also rejected language (in
the final House version) that would more clearly have stated the "no aid" position. Jus-
tice Souter places great stress on the drafters' supposed knowledge of the events in Vir-
ginia leading to disestablishment there, but fails to note that the views Madison ex-
pressed during that time were not shared by most of his fellow congressmen, Moreover,
Justice Souter ignores the prevailing religious world view and the general program of
aid to religion in all states, and as I shall discuss, the incongruity of the Amendment's
noncontroversial ratification in light of that background. Finally, Justice Souter provides
no evidence that the drafting history was known to the ratifiers, who were asked to rati-
fy an amendment containing a key term, "establishment of religion," that had an estab-
lished legal meaning inconsistent with the "no aid" position. In short, the drafting histo-
ry of the Establishment Clause does not support the expansive definition given the
Clause by the Court in Everson or by modem advocates of a secular society.
257 Everson, 330 U.S. at 11.
258 See BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS, supra note 47, at 112-15.
259 Everson, 330 U.S. at 31-32 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
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the Bill of Rights ... was (in composite profile) perfunctory, without sig-
nificant debate or opposition .. ". . "' Newspapers of the period revealed
no controversy.261 The most plausible inference to be drawn from this evi-
dence is that the ratifiers did not effect the revolution found by the Court in
Everson.
The ratification process in Virginia was not so perfunctory, and there is
a record of how the Virginians interpreted the Religion Clauses. Virginia re-
jected what is now the First Amendment, and accompanied that rejection
with a critique of the Amendment.26 The Virginians' interpretation of the
Amendment does not support the complete separation or "no aid" view.
Rather, the Virginians noted about the Establishment Clause that
although it goes to restrain Congress from passing laws es-
tablishing any national religion, they might, notwithstanding,
levy taxes to any amount, for the support of religion or its
preachers; and any particular denomination of Christians
might be so favored and supported by the General Govern-
ment as to give it a decided advantage over others, and in
the process of time render it as powerful and dangerous as if
it was established as the national religion of the country.263
As Bradley notes, this critique, published in the Richmond newspaper,
"stands as the clearest, most concise, most authoritative definition of the
religious clauses in the entire history of ratification by the states.
' 264
Thus, neither the text of the Establishment Clause nor its historical back-
ground support the view that the Clause merely summed up Madison's and
Jefferson's views regarding church-state relationships, much less the view
that the Clause requires a complete separation between religion and govern-
ment prohibiting all government aid to or encouragement of religion. 65
260 BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS, supra note 47, at 114.
261 See id. at 115 ("[T]he newspaper editors, usually avid, entirely partisan observers
of things political, said almost nothing about the journey of the amendments through the
states.").
262 See id. at 117-18.
263 Id. at 117 (quoting KATE MASON ROWLAND, THE LIFE OF GEORGE MASON, 1721-
1792, at 321 (1853)) (emphasis added); see also Corwin, supra note 190, at 12 n.33.
264 See BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS, supra note 47, at 118.
265 In any event, importing Jefferson's and Madison's views of church-state relation-
ships into the First Amendment does not support the strict separationist view, at least if
we judge Jefferson and Madison by their actions. Jefferson, fbr example, signed treaties
with the Indians calling for payments for churches and priests. See American Jewish
Congress v. City of Chicago, 827 F.2d 120, 136 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). He also
approved a plan allowing religious denominations to establish schools on the University
of Virginia campus to allow students the opportunity to receive religious training. Re-
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Certainly the first several generations of American legislators (including
those who actually drafted the Amendment) did not think that government
aid to or encouragement of religion was inconsistent with the Religion
Clauses. The laws these men enacted are compelling evidence against the
secularist interpretation of the First Amendment.266
As others have noted the early legislation in detail, it is sufficient here
to note Professor McConnell's comment that "[e]xponents of strict separa-
tion are embarrassed by the many breaches in the wall of separation counte-
nanced by those who adopted the first amendment: the appointment of con-
gressional chaplains, the provision in the Northwest Ordinance for religious
education, the resolutions calling upon the President to proclaim days of
prayer and thanksgiving, the Indian treaties under which Congress paid the
salaries of priests and clergy, and so on." '267 Indeed, the very day after rec-
ommending what is now the First Amendment to the states for ratification,
the House (apparently without dissent from Madison) passed a resolution
calling on President Washington to proclaim a national day of thanksgiving
and prayer. 68 This was not the action of a group of men who believed that
port of the Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia (Oct. 7, 1822), in 19 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 413-16 (1905); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Dr.
Cooper (Nov. 2, 1822), in 15 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 403-06 (1905).
Besides sponsoring the Sabbath-breaker law in the Virginia legislature, Madison voiced
no objection when the first House appointed a chaplain, or called on President Wash-
ington to proclaim a day of prayer and thanksgiving, and himself offered Thanksgiving
proclamations as president. For a more detailed account of Jefferson's and Madison's
official actions regarding religion, see CORD, supra note 213, at 27-47.
266 As Professor Bradley notes, the Supreme Court "has repeatedly laid down the
principle that a contemporaneous legislative exposition of the Constitution when the
founders of our Government and framers of our Constitution were actively participating
in public affairs, long acquiesced in, fixes the construction to be given its provision."
BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS, supra note 47, at 97 (quoting Hampton Co.
v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 412 (1928)).
267 McConnell, Coercion, supra note 199, at 939. For a detailed account of such leg-
islation, see CORD, supra note 213, at 23 (congressional chaplain appointed by first
Congress); id. at 27-29 (successful House vote on resolution calling for presidential
thanksgiving proclamation, made the day after the House voted to recommend the First
Amendment to the states); id. at 51-82 (thanksgiving proclamations, chaplaincies, Indian
treaties calling for financial support of religious organizations, and treaties providing
financial support to religious schools and teachers).
268 CORD, supra note 213, at 27. The Senate also requested a thanksgiving proclama-
tion, and President Washington delivered such a proclamation on October 3, 1789. Id. at
51-52. The proclamation set aside a day "to be devoted.., to the service of that great
and glorious Being who is the beneficent author of all the good that was, that is, or that
will be." Id. at 52. The proclamation went on to call for Americans to "unite in most
humbly offering our prayers and supplications to the great Lord and Ruler of Nations,
and beseech Him to pardon our national and other transgressions" and generally to be-
stow His blessings on the nation. Id. Apparently, Washington did not share Justice
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government and religion were to be kept completely separate.
The Northwest Ordinance, and the early governance of the territories,
are of special interest. As noted, the Confederation Congress enacted the
Northwest Ordinance in 1787 to provide for the governance of the western
territories.269 The First Congress, in the same year it proposed the Estab-
lishment Clause to the states, reenacted the ordinance."'
As noted earlier, the Northwest Ordinance proclaimed that "[r]eligion,
morality and knowledge, being necessary to good government and the hap-
piness of mankind, schools and the means ofeducation shall forever be en-
couraged."27' More important than this, however, is that "[t]he territorial
regime established during the Confederation, expressly validated and contin-
ued by the First Congress and its successors, was suffused with aid, encour-
agement, and support for religion .... [T]he first congressmen knew [this]
when they reenacted the ordinance. '"272 Thus, for instance, land reserva-
tions were made for the support of religion.2 73 Church construction was
supported by lottery exemptions.2 74 Territories enacted blasphemy and Sab-
bath-breaking lawsY.5 Even after the Eighth Congress expressly declared
null and void any territorial enactments that conflicted with the Constitution,
territorial governments continued to aid and support religion . 6 All in all,
the Northwest Ordinance and governance in the territories illustrate that the
founding generation did not consider aid to religion to be inconsistent with
the Establishment Clause.
Some commentators have acknowledged that many of the legislative
actions of the founding generation-the thanksgiving proclamations, the leg-
islative chaplaincies, the Northwest Ordinance, the Indian treaties, and so
forth-are inconsistent with a broad reading of the Establishment
Clause. 77 These commentators have maintained that those practices show
only that the framers did not fully understand the implications of what they
O'Connor's concern about the impropriety of "endorsing" religion.
269 See BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS, supra note 47, at 98.
270 Id.
271 NORTHWEST ORDINANCE art. III; see supra note 48 and accompanying text.
272 BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS, supra note 47, at 98. Professor
Bradley provides a detailed discussion of the ordinance, territorial governance, grants to
religious groups for work among the Indians, and treaties obliging the federal govern-
ment to fund sectarian missions. See generally id. at 97-104.
273 Id. at 98-99. Along the same lines, during the decade after the Establishment
Clause was ratified, Congress appropriated 12,000 acres of land for the United Brethren
to propagate the Gospel among the Indians. Id. at 100; CORD, supra note 213, at 41-46.
274 BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS, supra note 47, at 102 (discussing
church financing in Orleans Territory).
275 Id. at 102-03.
276 Id. at 101-02.
277 See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2670 n.3, 2675; Laycock,
"Nonpreferential" Aid, supra note 195, at 919.
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had written, or simply that old habits are hard to break.27 But given the
general public view at the time toward religion and government's relation-
ship with religion, and the personal views of the majority of the congress-
men who actually recommended the First Amendment to the states for ratifi-
cation," a more reasonable inference is that the legislators of the found-
ing generation were acting consistently with their own-and the general
public's-understanding of the Establishment Clause's prohibitions.
Justice Story, writing much closer to the time of the Establishment
Clause's adoption, would not have attributed the Framers' actions to misun-
derstanding or "backsliding.""28 In his Commentaries on the Constitu-
tion,28" ' Justice Story accurately captured the prevailing sentiment in the
country during the late 1780s when he wrote:
Probably at the time of adoption of the Constitution, and of
the amendment to it, now under consideration, the general, if
not the universal sentiment in America was, that christianity
ought to receive encouragement from the state, so far as was
not incompatible with the private rights of conscience, and
the freedom of religious worship. An attempt to level all reli-
gions, and to make it a matter of state policy to hold all in
utter indifference, would have created universal disapproba-
tion if not universal indignation.2 2
Justice Story's interpretation is light years from the prevailing view that
278 See Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2670 n.3 (Souter, J., concurring) (commenting that the
Framers' actions "prove only that public officials, no matter when they serve, can turn a
blind eye to constitutional principle"); id. at 2675 (Souter, J., concurring) (brushing off
Madison's "failure to keep pace with his principles in the face of congressional pres-
sure" as "backsliding," and suggesting that actions such as Washington's and Adams's
thanksgiving proclamations "prove, at best, that the Framers simply did not share a
common understanding of the Establishment Clause, and, at worst, that they ... could
raise constitutional ideals one day and turn their backs on them the next"); Laycock,
Nonpreferential Aid, supra note 195, at 919 (attributing the Framers' actions to "unre-
flective bigotry" or the dynamics of the political process); see also Smith, Separation
and the "Secular," supra note 3, at 972 n.96 (citing other commentators making this
general argument).
279 See supra notes 214-53 and accompanying text.
280 Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2675 (Souter, J., concurring).
2' JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
(1833).
282 Id. § 1874 (emphasis added); see Corwin, supra note 190, at 15. Likewise Thom-
as Cooley, in the middle and late 1800s, took "establishment of religion" to mean state
favoritism for one sect over another. See id. at 15-16 (citing THOMAS COOLEY, CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 469 (2d ed. 1871); THOMAS COOLEY, PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 224-25 (3d. ed. 1898)).
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(with a few minor exceptions) the First Amendment was meant to separate
the realms of government and politics from the realm of religion, and that
religion is a private matter that should be left at home or in the church. The
history surrounding the First Amendment's enactment tells us that the pres-
ent view does not accurately reflect the Establishment Clause's original
meaning. The Clause does not require that religion be kept completely sepa-
rate from government and politics. Nor does it prohibit all aid to or encour-
agement of religion. These modem ideas would have, in Justice Story's
words, "created universal disapprobation if not universal indignation"2 3
among the founding generation.
Scholars have suggested different doctrinal approaches that are truer to
the historically-revealed meaning of the Establishment Clause than the Lem-
on test or Everson's "no aid" principle from which that test ultimately de-
rives."4 While these approaches may draw lines in different places, those
differences are not important for present purposes. At a minimum, an histor-
ically correct interpretation of the Establishment Clause would not create a
constitutional crisis when private citizens or public officials bring their reli-
gious beliefs to bear in the public square or political arena. Thus, the notion
of perceived endorsement, which stifles private religious speech in public
fora by magically transforming that speech into state action, should be put
283 Id. at 15 (quoting STORY, supra note 281, §1874).
284 Several scholars have suggested that the guiding principle is nonpreferentialism or
sect neutrality. See, e.g., BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS, supra note 47;
CORD, supra note 213; Corwin, supra note 190. Under this view, aid to religion does
not violate the Establishment Clause so long as it does not discriminate in favor of one
particular religion. As Professor Bradley notes, this approach is not necessarily political-
ly conservative or liberal. BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS, supra note 47, at
145. For example, although financial aid to all religious private schools would be con-
stitutional under a regime of sect neutrality, state-sponsored school prayer likely would
not be, since it is probably impossible to compose a truly "neutral" prayer. See id.
Professor Smith, on the other hand, has advanced the theory that the Establishment
Clause requires only separation between government and religious institutions. See
Smith, Separation and the "Secular," supra note 3, at 971. Thus, in Smith's view, gov-
ernmental actions that do not constitute excessive intrusion into the internal affairs of
religious institutions do not violate the Establishment Clause. See generally id. As
Smith notes, this interpretation reconciles Justice Story's view that the Clause was not
intended to "level all religions" and that "Christianity ought to receive encouragement
from the state" with Jefferson's "wall" metaphor. Id. at 974. Neither Story nor Jefferson
asserted that the decision to prohibit establishments separates religion from government;
rather, as Jefferson's metaphor literally states, the required separation is between the
institutions of church and state. Under Smith's approach, a brief nondenominational
school prayer likely would be constitutional under the Establishment Clause, although if
not voluntary it would present a free exercise or free speech problem. See id. at 974-75.
Aid to religious schools would be constitutional under this approach unless the govern-
ment so conditioned the aid as to require excessive governmental intrusion into the
schools' governance. See id. at 1022-23.
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to rest once and for all. Government officials should not have to fear that
their legislative work will necessarily be invalid because they were honest
about their religious motives or purposes, or that the legislation "promotes"
or "endorses" a religious point of view.
Specifically, Widmar, Mergens, and Lambs Chapel were correctly decid-
ed but should have been more forthright in rejecting the perceived endorse-
ment argument (something the Court should remedy in Pinette). Both
Jaffree and Edwards were wrong. That objective presentation of secular data
(for example, fossil records) might lead students to a conclusion that rein-
forces religious beliefs should not invalidate a state's legitimate curricular
choice. 5 The fact that legislators might have hoped for this result should
not matter, unless we expect legislators to leave behind their religious be-
liefs when they legislate. Likewise, states should be able to require schools
to set aside time for voluntary reflection-even specifically religious reflec-
tion." 6 An interpretation of the Establishment Clause that recognizes that
the state can encourage religion should recognize that government need not
be neutral between religion and nonreligion. Legislators may-and in some
cases, should--enact laws that specifically encourage or accommodate reli-
gious practice, even if they are not neutral with regard to non-religious
practices. 7 Such "neutrality" amounts to "utter indifference" toward reli-
285 For example, should philosphy courses omit reference to Thomas Aquinas' argu-
ment for the existence of God because some students will find that argument convinc-
ing?
286 Professor Bradley suggests that under a nonpreferentialist interpretation of the Es-
tablishment Clause, moment-of-silence laws might violate the Establishment Clause if
they encourage "specifically religious reflection." BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATION-
SHIPS, supra note 47, at 145. While it is possible that a moment-of-silence law that
mentioned only "prayer" may not be sect-neutral (because "prayer" implies a personal
God who listens to prayer) it does not follow that encouraging generally religious re-
flection violates the sect-neutrality principle unless that principle also requires neutrality
between religion and non-religion. I do not believe that is so; therefore, the Alabama
statute, which encouraged "meditation or prayer," should be constitutional since "medi-
tation and prayer" are broad enough to encompass the universe of religious contempla-
tion.
287 An historical analog for this would be the common practice in the founding era of
allowing lotteries to fund church construction, even though lotteries were generally ille-
gal. Based on the principle that the Establishment Clause does not prohibit the state
from preferring religion over non-religion, I believe Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock,
489 U.S. 1 (1989), was wrongly decided. In Bullock, the Court struck down a Texas
statute that granted a sales tax exemption only to religious periodicals. Id. at 5. The
Court found that this preference for religious publications "effectively endorses religious
belief." Id. at 17 (plurality opinion); id. at 28 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Bullock is
correct only if the Establishment Clause requires neutrality between religion and non-
religion; I believe history effectively refutes that contention.
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gion, something the First Amendment, properly understood in its historical
context, does not require.
V. CONCLUSION
Nothing I have said here should be interpreted to be a call for theocracy.
I do not want the government to be the political auxiliary of any church (or
the church to be the religious arm of government). As I noted at the outset,
churches should not run the state and the state should not run churches. Nor
should religious organizations get in the habit of lining up for their turn at
the public trough. Such behavior can breed dependency, and dependency
would inevitably weaken religion. This does not mean, however, that reli-
gion and religious beliefs must be squeezed out of the public square or be
kept completely separate from the governmental and political processes. In-
deed, as our founding generation recognized, religion and religious ideas are
necessary to liberty and self-government. Therefore, within reasonable lim-
its, government ought to aid and encourage religion, and religious believers
should not need to check their beliefs at the capital door. Nor must believers
be afraid to speak out in the public square for fear of being "divisive" (al-
though charity and prudence require that believers not set out intentionally
to offend).
An historically accurate interpretation of the First Amendment does not
disable the government from promoting religion, or require religion to be
divorced from the public policy process. The First Amendment did not cre-
ate a secular public society. Current Establishment Clause jurisprudence,
capsulized in the three-part Lemon test, is inconsistent with this insight. The
Supreme Court has two opportunities to reconsider Lemon this term or
next.288 For the sake of religious believers, our society, and our culture
(and for the sake of doctrinally sound jurisprudence), the Court should aban-
don Lemon and the "no aid" principle from which it sprang.
288 See Pinette v. Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd., 115 S. Ct. 787 (1995),
certifying questions to 30 F.3d 675 (6th Cir. 1994); Rosenberger v. Rector of the Uni-
versity of Virginia, 115 S. Ct. 417 (1995), certifying questions to 18 F.3d 269 (4th Cir.
1994).
[Vol. 4:1
